The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment by DiMatteo, Larry A.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 48 Issue 2 Article 4 
Winter 1997 
The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard 
and the Subjectivity of Judgment 
Larry A. DiMatteo 
University of Miami 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity 
of Judgment, 48 S. C. L. Rev. 293 (1997). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
THE COUNTERPOISE OF CONTRACTS:
THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD AND
THE SUBJECTIVITY OF JUDGMENT
Larry A. DiMatteo"
"[T]he law that is in us by nature is nothing else than
the reasoning creature's sharing in the eternal law."
Saint Thomas Aquinas**
I. INTRODUCTION .........................
A. The Twentieth Century Revolution: Subjectivism
Versus Objectivism .....................
B. The Domain of the External ...............
C. Symmetry of Form and Cardozo's Objective Change.
D. The Reasonable Person Standard ............
E. The Reasonable Person's Predisposition Towards
Intentionality ........................
II. THE ROOTS OF THE REASONABLE PERSON .........
A. The Religious Reasonable Person ............
B. The Philosophical Reasonable Person .........
C. Psychoanalyzing the Reasonable Person ........
D. The Judicial Mind and the Reasonable Person ....
Im. FABRICATING THE REASONABLE PERSON ..........
A. The Parties and the Totality of the Circumstances . .
An Aside: The Main Purpose Doctrine ......
B. Custom and Trade Usage: The Reasonable Person
Is a Working Person ....................
1. A Reason to Know: The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and the Reasonable Person .......
2. The Reasonable Person as a Precursor ......
3. Llewellyn 's Double-Barreled Objectivity ......
4. The Language of the Reasonable Person......
C. From Who's Perspective Does the Reasonable Person
View the Contractual Landscape? ............
1. The Reasonable Person as Promisee ........
2. The Reasonable Person as Promisor ........
...... 294
...... 295
...... 297
...... 299
...... 301
...... 303
...... 305
...... 305
...... 309
...... 314
...... 316
...... 317
...... 318
...... 324
...... 325
...... 327
...... 328
...... 329
...... 331
...... 332
...... 333
...... 333
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Miami; B.A./B.A., State University of
New York at Buffalo, 1979; J.D., The Cornell Law School, 1982.
** Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, in THOMAS AQUINAS SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS 419 (Timothy McDermott trans., 1993) (emphasis added).
1
DiMatteo: The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
294 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:293
3. The Reasonable Person as a Third-Party ........... 334
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD ........ 336
A. The Manipulation of the Reasonable Person ............ 336
1. The Reasonable Person and the Consumer
Form Contract ........................... 338
2. The Relational Reasonable Person ............... 341
B. Reliance Theory and the Reasonable Person ............ 342
V. THE SUBJECTwITY OF JUDGMENT .................... 343
A. Gardner, Holmes, and Llewellyn on Judicial Constraints .... 345
B. The Subjectivity of Judgment ..................... 347
1. Discretion as the Touchstone of Subjectivity .......... 349
2. The Reasonable Person as Synthesis .............. 350
VI. THE REASONABLE PERSON AND CONTRACT LAW'S
INNER EXPERIENCE ............................. 353
VII. SUMMA ................................... 355
I. INTRODUCTION
Who is this all-knowing arbiter of reasonableness known as the reasonable
person? From what organic and metaphysical antecedents has this person
evolved? Is the reasonable person one and the same with Kant's rational
being, or tort's reasonably prudent man2 or Lord Denning's officious
bystander?3 How do courts go about creating this contractual mystic? How
1. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis
Beck trans., 1969) (highlighting his views of the rational being).
2. See generally WiLUAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 32-33, at
149-80 (4th ed. 1971) (detailing the attributes and capacities of the reasonably prudent man
standard and how courts should apply it). Professor Eisenberg describes the difference between
the reasonable man of tort and the reasonable person of contract as one of perception. The
reasonable person perceives the likelihood of certain consequences stemming from the actions in
question. In tort, the reasonable person must perceive only a low degree of probability to hold
a person accountable for wrongdoing. In contract, a higher degree of probability is necessary.
"In the case of a breach of contract, the court has to consider whether the conse-
quences were of such a kind that a reasonable man, at the time of making the
contract, would contemplate them as being of a very substantial degree of probability
In the case of a tort, the court has to consider whether the consequences were of
such a kind that a reasonable man, at the time of the tort committed, would foresee
them as being of a much lower degree of probability."
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REv. 563, 580 n.48
(1992) (quoting H. Parsons Livestock Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [1978] Q.B. 791 (C.A.
1977) (opinion of Lord Denning, M.R.)). The concept of the reasonable person can be seen
elsewhere in the law. See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, Note, The Prudent Investor Rule: Theories and
Evidence, 1 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1994).
3. See generally LORD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW (1979) (criticizing the strict
2
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can the use of the objective reasonable person be reconciled with the subjec-
tive, discretionary nature of judicial decision-making? Cardozo's notion of
judge as creator,' Liewellyn's reference to the leeways of the law, s and Roscoe
Pound's notion of judicial intuition6 all smack of a process ripe with the fruits
of subjectivity. The advancement of the objective theory's reasonable person
must pass through this subjective filter of the judicial mind. How can the
objective theory better incorporate the fact that subjective elements play an
inherently important role in the interpretation of objective reality? These
questions are addressed in this article.
This article will first attempt to uncover the ancestral roots of contract
law's reasonable person by analyzing three fields of study: theology,
philosophy, and psychology. The next part will investigate the material utilized
by the courts in constructing the ad hoc reasonable person. The focus will be
upon use of custom, trade usage, and commercial practice as the genetic
building blocks of the reasonable person. The final two parts will look to the
role of subjectivity in the creation and the application of the reasonable person.
Just how objective is the reasonable person given the reality of judicial
discretion?
A. The Twentieth Century Revolution: Subjectivism Versus Objectivism
The rise of the reasonable person standard and the objective theory of
contract during the twentieth century was not without ancestral roots. The use
of formality to provide objective guidance for assessing contractual liability
can be traced back to Roman times. Roman contract law was structured upon
objective formality, not subjective agreement. "[C]ompletion of the proper
formalities, rather than consent, was determinative." 7 Our Anglo-American
tradition is filled with similar formality. Examples include the sealed
instrument, livery of seisin, and the Statute of Frauds. The seeds of the
reasonable person as applied to manifestations of intent are found in these
historical formalities. The Roman stipulatio, the giving of sacramentum, and
in Germanic law, the giving of a thing or aries, were objective means upon
which contractual liability was affixed. 8 Durkheim has written that it was
constructionists' rigid adherence to precedent).
4. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103-04 (Yale Univ.
Press 1965) (1921).
5. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA (Paul Gerwitz ed. & Michael
Ansaldi trans., 1989).
6. KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTrIVTY 205 (1992) (examining the notion of legal
objectivity and its relation to judicial intuition).
7. David P. Doughty, Comment, Error Revisited: The Louisiana Revision of Error as a Vice
of Consent in Contracting, 62 TUL. L. REv. 717, 718 (1988).
8. For a concise and clear description of these ancient rituals and practices see generally
1997]
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"these ceremonies that gave an objective character to the word and to the
resolve of the promisor."' The notion of manifestation of intent can be seen
as a modem substitute for these ancient rituals. Implicit in the notion of
manifestation of intent is the need to measure and judge that manifestation. In
order to fairly attribute legal consequences to a person's manifestations, a
neutral, third party arbiter was needed. This fair-minded, all-knowing figure
had to be available to judge a potentially infinite number of factual situations.
This desideratum was the impetus for the development of the reasonable person
standard.
The revolution transforming contract law towards an objective pole is
often associated with Holmesian jurisprudential thought. "The central tenet of
Holmes's jurisprudential thought was that the ... rules of law [constantly
move] toward an end point at which the original moral content of a given rule
will have quite disappeared and the subjective state of mind of the [parties] will
have become irrelevant."' This tenet espouses an inevitable movement toward
the rule of the objective reasonable person. Professor Gilmore reconfigured the
common law's paradigmatic conversion from the subjective to the objective as
a changing of the decisional matrix from resolving questions of fact to
questions of law. The subjectivity of the factual inquiry was replaced by the
application of rules through the medium of the reasonable person. A party's
conduct, not a party's intent, would determine contractual liability. The facts
were used to decide, as a matter of law, whether the action in question should
be considered "permissible [or] impermissible 'conduct.""'
The revolutionary movement from the subjective theory to the objective
theory of contracts has been a relatively universal phenomena. A commentator
on Australian law notes that in "the nineteenth century it was common to
regard a contract as resulting from the true meeting of the minds .... The
modem tendency is to determine the existence of agreement on a more objec-
tive basis . . . ,," English law in the area of contractual interpretation has
evolved in the same manner. One treatise writer explains that the "general
EMILE DURKHEIM, DURKHEIM AND THE LAW 196-200 (Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull eds., 2d
ed. 1983).
9. Id. at 213.
10. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 41 (1974).
11. Id. at 42.
If... the "actual state of the parties' minds" is relevant, then each litigated case must
become an extended factual inquiry into what was "intended,". . . . If, however, we
can restrict ourselves to the "externals," . . . then the factual inquiry will be much
simplified and in time can be dispensed with altogether as the courts accumulate
precedents about recurring types of permissible and impermissible "conduct." By this
process questions, originally perceived as questions of fact, will resolve themselves
into questions of law.
Id.
12. R.B. VERMEESCH & K.E. LINDGREN, BusiNEss LAW OF AUsTRALIA 133 (2d ed. 1973).
[Vol. 48:293
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principle of interpretation of contracts was, in the older view, to ascertain the
actual intention of the parties to the contract. The modem view is to ascertain
'what each [party] was reasonably entitled to conclude... of the other.""
3
The rise of the reasonable person standard and the objectification of contract
law was forewarned by Henry Sumner Maine in his often cited Ancient Law. 4
Maine saw the movement of law towards an objective basis as a natural
progression. He wrote: "Lastly, the Consensual Contracts emerge, in which the
mental attitude of the contractors is solely regarded, and external circumstances
have no title to notice except as evidence of the inward undertaking."' 5 The
malleability and popularity of the reasonable person approach and the objective
theory was duly noted by Professor Gilmore. "[T]he 'objective theory of
contract' became the great metaphysical solvent-the critical test for distin-
guishing between the false and the true."' 6
B. The Domain of the External
Justice Holmes saw legal development as the inevitable movement toward
objectivity. 7 The rise of the reasonable person standard was a gradual
development. At first, the will theorists viewed the reasonable person standard
as merely providing evidence of the subjective understandings of the parties.'
Morton Horwitz exposed the fallacy of viewing the reasonable person as a
device for approximating the subjective intent of the contracting parties.
In the process of formalizing and generalizing the system of contract law,
the legal rules came to bear a more and more tenuous relationship to the
actual intent of the parties. What once could be defended and justified as
simply a more efficacious way of carrying out the parties' intentions came
eventually to be perceived as a system that subordinated and overruled the
parties' will.' 9
13. CLIVE M. ScHMIrTHOFF & DAVID A.G. SARuF, CHARLEswoRTH's MERCANTILE LAW
191-92 (14th ed. 1984) (quoting McCutcheon v. David Macbrayne Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 125,
128 (H.L. 1964) (opinion by Lord Reid)) (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
14. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCiENT LAW 328 (Henry Holt & Co. 1883) (1861).
15. Id.
16. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 42-43.
17. Justice Holmes succinctly stated: "The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the
parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties by their
conduct." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 242 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
18. The meeting of the minds, or will theory, held that a "man is not bound by a contractual
duty unless he willed it so." ARTHUR L. CoRBiN, CoRBiN ON CONTRACTs § 106 (1952). The
theory under its purest form requires a finding of actual subjective intent and not the mere
objective manifestation of intent. Furthermore, there must be a communal or mutual subjective
consent or consensus ad idem. Id.
19. MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERiCAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 35
19971
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The difficulty in proving actual intent can be seen as the impetus for the
reasonable person to interpret contracts based upon community standards of
fairness and custom. "Problems of intentionality ... seem soluble if one puts
aside their subjective aspect."20 Professor Fried noted that "it seems as if
contractual relations depend not on the will of the parties but on externally
imposed substantive moral judgments of what the relations between the parties
should be."2 This illustrates the normative persona of the reasonable person.
In contrast, the descriptive reasonable person simply is placed in the shoes of
the parties to determine their intended meanings. The fairness of those
meanings is of little concern. The normative reasonable person acts as a
surrogate for society, whose mandate is not the discovery of what the parties
reasonably intended, but the discovery of what society believes they should
have intended.
Professor Atiyah describes this tension between the descriptive and the
normative reasonable persons. It can also be seen as a battle between the
competing notions of freedom of contract and fairness in the exchange.
The extent to which the courts and the law are prepared to go in treating
promises... merely as prima facie rather than conclusive evidence of the
fairness of an exchange, is ... determined by the degree of paternalism
which commends itself to ... the judiciary in question. A society which
believes in allowing the skilful and knowledgeable to reap the rewards of
their skill and knowledge is likely to have a higher regard for the sanctity
of promises than a society which wishes to protect the weak and foolish
from the skilful and knowledgeable.22
The reasonable person, either under the banner of sanctity of contract or
that of fairness, is used to fill gaps in otherwise inchoate contracts. The
mechanism for this effort is the application of the gap-filling or default rules
of contract. Professor Barnett, in his work on default rules, states that "when
parties fail to exercise their power to alter the law of contract for their
transaction, their silence has a normative consequence as well."' That norma-
tive consequence is the use of the reasonable person to impose the background
rules of contract law.
(1992).
20. THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONs 201 (1979).
21. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 75 (1981) (emphasis added).
22. P.S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 L.Q. REv. 193, 209
(1978).
23. Randy E. Barnett, ... And Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 421, 427
(1993). Professor Barnett argues that default rules are nonetheless consensually based. "[A]
manifested consent to be legally bound is what justifies a court in enforcing default rules on
parties who made incomplete commitments ..... Id. at 429.
[Vol. 48:293
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The externality represented by the imposition of default rules by the
reasonable person was forcefully advanced by Oliver Wendell Holmes: "The
law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties' minds. In contract,
as elsewhere, it must go by externals."2 These externals are found in the
judicial mind-set pertaining to community standards of fairness and reason-
ableness. The implication of society's rules of fairness and reasonableness is
generally accomplished through the courts' fabrication of the reasonable person.
The reasonable person is the personification of contract law's externalities.
Some have seen the reasonable person as a subterfuge for court imposed
standards. Professor Patterson recognizes a gap-filling duality consisting of
interpretive and substantive types. 25 Interpretive completeness is the juxtapos-
ing of the reasonable person into the shoes of the contracting parties. The court
weaves a conclusion of implied intent based upon an analysis of the essential
nature of the contract, along with its contractual context. Substantive
completeness is not amenable to the fiction of second-order or implied intent.
The party-focused reasonable person is discarded and replaced with a
communal standard. "[W]here there is in fact no agreement, the court should
supply a term which comports with community standards of fairness and policy
rather than analyze a hypothetical model of the [particular] bargaining
process. 26
C. Symmetry of Form and Cardozo 's Objective Change
Formality is the reasonable person's closest ally. To the extent that
contracting parties can channel their dealings into legally recognizable forms,
the task of the reasonable person will be easier. Professor Fuller, in his seminal
article Consideration and Form, exposed the benefit of the use of recognizable
legal instruments and the formal rules of contract law. "[F]orm offers a legal
framework into which the party may fit his actions, or, . . . it offers channels
for the legally effective expression of intention. '27 A selection of a recognized
24. HOLMES, supra note 17, at 242. Professor Corbin refers to the externals upon which
contract law imposes liability as "based upon principles of justice, policy, and right, and not on
the expressed will of the parties." Arthur L. Corbin, Discharge of Contracts, 22 YALE L.J. 513,
515 (1913). Learned Hand explained the role of the reasonable person as one of interpreter. The
words or acts of the parties are only significant if they can be "reasonably interpreted." He
defines reasonably interpreted as having "meaning to ordinary men." Hotchkiss v. National City
Bank, 200 F. 287, 294-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). This determination is made by the court through its
use of the reasonable (ordinary) person. "jT]he question always remains for the court to interpret
the reasonable meaning to the acts of the parties, by word or deed, and no characterization of its
effect by either party thereafter, however truthful, is material." Id. at 294.
25. See Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate Over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDIsC. L.J. 235 (1993).
26. Id. at 249 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (1981)).
27. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 801 (1941); cf Charles
1997]
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form or instrument provides strong evidence to the reasonable person regarding
the parties intended legal obligations. The now archaic contractual seal
provided such irrefutable evidence. It was a clear objective "form recognized
by law or custom as sufficient for the creation of a valid power in the
promisee."" The power thus created would be the ability to seek the help of
the reasonable person in the area of enforcement and remediation.
There are different degrees of formality that can be found in the law of
contracts. The instruments of custom and trade usage help formalize the
meanings of certain words and practices. The formalities of consideration and
of a writing provide evidence of the intended legal nature of a transaction or
of a relationship. Formalities possess a direct relationship to the discovery of
objective intent. They provide the facts upon which the reasonable person
renders decisions. "[F]ormality... tends to effect a categorization of
transactions into legal and non-legal."29  The formalities of contract are
simply categorizations of objective manifestations that the reasonable person
uses as a sound evidentiary base for determining the intent and meaning of a
contract.3
The normative grounding for the rules of contract is the quest for
symmetry. The norms of certainty, predictability, and generality have been
given as rationales for the application of contractual rules. The operational
system used for the symmetrical application of contract doctrine and rules is
the reasonable person. The reasonable person provides the software upon which
the courts are able to objectively apply contract rules. The need to maintain
symmetry and generality of law was advanced by Justice Cardozo within the
conceptual framework of his method of philosophy. Cardozo concluded that a
judge's standard for decision-making "must be an objective one."'" His
conception of law was firmly rooted in the importance of maintaining the
generality of law. This conception maintains that the reasonable person must
be wholly objective. The reasonable person must not give into the temptation
to do justice in a particular case that would be in contradiction to a purely
objective and generalized application of a rule of law.
L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 727 (1969) (discussing the
unchanneled areas of contract where recognizable formalities are missing and observing that
"contracts do not really spring, full-blown, from the collective brows of the parties").
28. George K. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 25 (1932).
29. Fuller, supra note 27, at 803.
30. The wider the acceptance of a contract form or of a contractual formality the more cautious
the parties will be in utilizing them. Once utilized, however, the likelihood of misunderstanding
is reduced. Formalities are deliberation-inducing devices that "tend... to make apparent to the
part[ies] the consequences of [their] action[s]." Id. Those consequences are also likely to be
apparent to the reasonable person from a retrospective view.
31. BENiAMw N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL PROCESS 89 (1921).
[Vol. 48:293
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This focus upon generality does not mean that Cardozo believed that the
reasonable person was rigid, static, or unchangeable. Cardozo, to the contrary,
believed in objective change rooted in custom, innovation, and pragmatism.
These rudiments of change are anchored in external objectivity. "A jurispru-
dence that is not constantly brought into relation to objective or external
standards incurs the risk of degenerating into.., a jurisprudence of mere
sentiment.... . 32  Cardozo concludes that nonadherence to objective stan-
dards such as the reasonable person would result in an "end to the reign of
law.
, 33
D. The Reasonable Person Standard
The objective theory dictates the use of an independent, mystical
interpreter of the expressions of contract. Professor Slawson states that "[t]he
objective theory of contracts ... dictates that a contract shall have the meaning
that a reasonable person would give it under the circumstances under which it
was made, if he knew everything he should plus everything [he] actually
knew., 34 A reasonable person must therefore be constructed on a case by
case basis. This substituted contracting party possesses the intellect, sophistica-
tion, and good faith demeanor of the average reasonable person.35 The issue
in dispute is then resolved by the application of this reasonable party. The
subjective intent of the parties is replaced by the intent of this reasonable
person applied ex ante.
Lord Denning, in the 1974 English case of Storer v. Manchester City
Council,36 restated the external focus of the objective theory of contract:
In contracts you do not look into the actual intent in a man's mind. You
look at what he said and did. A contract is formed when there is, to all
outward appearances, a contract. A man cannot get out of a contract by
saying: "I did not intend to contract" if by his words he has done so. His
intention is to be found only in the outward expression .... 7
32. Id. at 106.
33. Id. at 136.
34. W. David Slawson, The Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL.
INTERmsc. L.J. 29, 38 (1993).
35. This demeanor of reasonableness has been codified throughout the Uniform Commercial
Code. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (1989) (reasonable price at time of delivery); U.C.C. § 2-306
(1989) (no quantity unreasonably disproportionate); U.C.C. § 2-309 (1989) (time of delivery shall
be a reasonable time); U.C.C. § 2-609 (1989) (reasonable grounds for insecurity).
36. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1403 (C.A. 1974).
37. Id. at 1408. The definitive statement of the objective theory in American law was
pronounced by Judge Learned Hand in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y.
1911).
1997]
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It is for the reasonable person to affix contractual liability based upon an
interpretation of the expressions of contract. In the traditional contracts model,
the enforcement of bargains, this interpretive inquiry focuses upon the intent
of the promisor. Reliance theory, however, requires the reasonable person to
interpret the reasonable consequences of an unreciprocated promise. 8 The
reasonable person standard is applied to determine if there has been reasonable
reliance on the part of the promisee.39 The expansion of contractual liability
through reliance theory has been dramatic.4" "The trend in contract law is to
compensate 'any detriment reasonably incurred by a plaintiff in reliance on a
defendant's assurances.".'4  By necessity, the reasonable person's role has
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual intent
of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain
acts of the parties... which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If,
however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words,
intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon them,
he would still be held ....
Id. at 293. The subjective theory still maintains well recognized areas of importance. For example,
the objective interpretation of outward manifestations will give way to the subjective knowledge
of the promisee. "A manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the
person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not
intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (preliminary negotiations).
38. "Section 90 of the Contracts Restatementprovides in effect that serious reliance may under
some circumstances make 'binding' a promise for which nothing has been given or promised in
exchange." L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46
YALE L.J. 373, 401 (1937) (footnote omitted).
39. RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 90 (detrimental reliance or promissory estoppel).
40. The first notable case to recognize detrimental reliance or promissory estoppel as a substi-
tute for bargained for consideration was the 1927 case of Allegheny College v. National
Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). Justice Kellogg's dissent describes the
lineage of promissory estoppel:
A so-called "promissory estoppel," although not so termed, was held sufficient by
Lord Mansfield and his fellow judges as far back as the year 1765. Such a
doctrine... is not a novelty. Therefore, I can see no ground for the suggestion that
the ancient rule which makes consideration necessary to the formation df every
contract is in danger of effacement ....
Id. at 178 (Kellogg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
41. Kenneth J. Goldberg, Note, Lender Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U. L. REv. 653, 669
(1988) (emphasis added) (quoting GILMORE, supra note 10, at 88); see also Nimrod Marketing
(Overseas) v. Texas Energy Inv. Corp., 769 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1985) (modem application of
reliance theory); Larry A. DiMatteo & Rene Sacasas, Credit and Value Comfort Instruments:
Crossing the Line From Assurance to Legally Significant Reliance and Toward a Theory of
Enforceability, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 357 (1995) (enforceability of comfort instruments as the
frontier of reliance liability); cf Phuong N. Pham, Note, The Waning of PromissoryEstoppel, 79
CORNELL L. REv. 1263 (1994) (discussing judicial reluctance to apply theories of promissory
estoppel despite widespread academic acceptance). See generally L. Fuller & William R. Perdue,
Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamage (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936), 46 YALE L.J.
[Vol. 48:293
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expanded to serve this duality of contractual liability: the interpretation of
promise42 and the determination of reliance.43
Section ninety of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement)
filters reliance recovery through the prism of the reasonable person in the
position of the promisee and of the promisor. The reasonable person is called
to make two determinations. First, was the promisee's reliance reasonable?
Second, the reliance "must be of such a kind as a reasonable person in [the]
position [of the promisor] would have foreseen when making the promise."'
Section ninety thus places a dual burden upon the reasonable person. This dual
role places a check upon unfettered reliance recovery. The court does not have
unlimited discretion to award damages for any provable reliance. A plaintiff
must show that a reasonable promisor would have foreseen such reliance.
E. The Reasonable Person's Predisposition Towards Intentionality
The reasonable person is supposed to be the neutral observer of external
manifestations of intent. This is not to say that the reasonable person does not
possess certain prejudices or predispositions. The reasonable person is a
creature of contract and is believed by some to possess a natural inclination
towards the finding of contractual intent. This presumption of intentionality is
grounded in the belief that parties generally do not intend to create meaningless
documents or to nonchalantly engage in contractual-type conduct. "[T]here is
a normal assumption that a business transaction is not meaningless and that
words have a purpose."45 There are a number of reasons that support the
notion of a presumption of intentionality. First, the burden is upon the party
producing the manifestations to disprove that they were non-contractual in
intent. Justice Hirst in the English case of Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Malaysia
Mining Corp.46 restated the presumption of intentionality. "'The onus of
373 (1937) (discussing policy interests served by awarding reliance damages); Charles L. Knapp,
Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 52 (1981) (discussing increased use of promissory estoppel theory).
42. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle andIts Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 741
(1982); cf Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 269 (1986)
(evaluating various theories of contractual obligation). See generally FRIED, supra note 21
(theorizing on the evolution of contract law).
43. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 90; see also Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of
Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1373 (tracing the historical development
of reliance theory).
44. CORBIN, supra note 18, § 200, at 289. The promisor, "should [have] reasonably expect[ed]
to induce action or forbearance." REsTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 90(1).
45. Chelsea Indus. v. Accuray Leasing Corp., 699 F.2d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing
Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc. v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 160 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ohio Ct. App.
1958)).
46. [1988] 1 W.L.R. 799 (Q.B. 1987).
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proving that there was no such intention [to create legal relations] is on the
party who asserts that no legal effect is intended, and the onus is a heavy
one.3' 47 Second, the contra proferentum rule favors a finding of intentionality.
This rule holds that in case of ambiguity when all other rules of construction
fail, the doubt is removed by construing the document adversely against the
drafter.4 This generally results in a finding of intent by the reasonable person.
The reasonable person's predisposition towards a finding of intentionality
is anchored in the notion of objective foreseeability. The notion of unfore-
seeability is the underlying principle for the doctrines of excuse including
commercial frustration and impracticability.49 If the issue or event in dispute
is deemed to be have been unforeseeable by the reasonable person, then an
excuse to liability may be granted. The event must have been unforeseeable
both by the parties and by the reasonable person. If unforeseen, then the
presumptions of intentionality and enforceability have been rebutted.
The reasonable person's presumption of intentionality also plays a key role
in the construction of instruments that are highly negotiated and ambiguously
worded. The use of comfort instruments"0 in the area of commercial and
financial practice is a case in point. These instruments possess language of a
contractual nature meant to assure a promisee, along with disclaimer-type
language aimed at insulating the promisor from any liability for the assurance.
The classically inclined reasonable person would look to the inherent ambiguity
of the instrument and find against contractual liability. One can argue, however,
that a more reasonable reasonable person would find it difficult to believe that
two sophisticated parties would pursue extensive negotiations over the wording
of a nonlegal instrument. Under reliance theory the perspective of the receiving
party would be the focus of the reasonable person inquiry. "[U]nder the
objective theory of contracts the test is whether a reasonable [person] in the
position of the [receiving party] would conclude that the [sending party] had
47. Id. at 803 (quoting CHrrTY ON CoNTR cTs 123 (25th ed. 1983) (quoting Edwards v.
Skyways Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 349, 355 (Q.B. 1964))).
48. See United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 216 (1970).
49. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-615 (1989); RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 261; see also Sheldon
W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for "The
Wisdom oiSolomon", 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123,1148 (1987) ("TIhe Code's apparently subjective
search for actual intent has not in fact displaced the centrality of objective foreseeability.").
50. The label "comfort instrument" or "comfort letter" is often used to refer to letters issued
by various types of businesspersons or professionals. Examples include letters of intent,
accountants' comfort letters or certifications, attorney opinion letters, and a parent company's
letter of assurance or responsibility sent on behalf ofa subsidiary. See Dimatteo & Sacasas, supra
note 41; see also ROBERT A. THOMPSON, REAL ESTATE OPINION LETrP PRACTIcE (1993)
(describing comfort letters in the real estate industry).
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made a commitment."'" The line between assurance and legally significant
reliance is tenuous at best.
II. THE ROOTS OF THE REASONABLE PERSON
It was once said that "[iun its origin law is religious." 2 The reasonable
person's genesis can be traced to religious and philosophical foundations. "The
great elementary conceptions of contract law came out of a Greek philosophical
tradition grafted on to Roman law by moral philosophers." 3 The notion of
a reasonable person residing in each human being can be found in the works
of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle. 4 They believed in the "existence of
natural virtues which incline men to act in accordance with right reason." 5
A look at the secularization of religious precepts into private law will add
insight into the reasonable person standard. Furthermore, philosophy of law
provides the rationales for the use and development of the constructs of the
reasonable person and of the objective theory.
A. The Religious Reasonable Person
The interdependence of legal, religious, and philosophical thought can be
traced to at least the twelfth century. Canon law was the preeminent force in
juridical studies of that century. Both canonists and theologians utilized all
three disciplines. 6 Beginning with Saint Augustine, law and philosophy were
used to justify religion as rationally based. The natural law was an object of
human will which could be found internally in communion with God.
Augustine believed that the natural law was based upon reason that could be
objectively proven. One can begin to see a possible source for the creation of
the reasonable person of contracts. Its roots can be seen in the development of
51. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-7, at 33 (2d ed.
1977).
52. JACQUES ELLUL, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW 18 (Marguerite Wieser trans.,
1960).
53. JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 246
(1991); see also ROSCOE POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 31 (5th ed. 1943)
(listing four foundational strains within his school of sociological jurisprudence as the historical,
the sociological, the philosophical; and the analytical).
54. Aristotle saw law as a "neutral and impersonal... arbiter." W. VON LEYDEN, ARISTOTLE
ON EQUALrrY AND JUSTICE 110 (1985). It is in this impartial arbiter that we begin to see the
rudiments of the reasonable person standard. "In being impersonal,. . . the rule of law can claim
to be objective and incorruptible... it is a mean and neutral authority, like Adam Smith's
'impartial spectator' or a Kantian regulative idea." Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 89.
56. Often times "the same person combined the offices of a theologian and a canonist."
MAURICE DE WULF, HISTORY OF MEDAEVEL PHILOSOPHY 289 (Ernest Messenger trans., 1938).
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the scholastic method of the twelfth century. The scholastic method's "primary
task was the summation of the text, the closing of gaps within it, and the
resolution of the contradictions."57 It was used to reconcile the text of Roman
law internally and also, externally with customary law. The notions of ratio-
nality and reasonableness became touchstones for both divine and secular laws.
The objectivity of contracts in turn began to be measured by religious
morality. In the Middle Ages the convergence of canon and secular law was
embodied in the rediscovery of Justinian's Codex, Novellae, Institutiones, and
Digestae. This was the genesis of the idea of the existence of an autonomous
device to judge private exchanges and relationships. "The Western legal
tradition still stands for the belief that so long as law remains autonomous, so
long as it conforms to reason and morality ... it will continue to be able to
resolve individual and social conflicts. . . ."" The reasonable person can be
seen as an external, autonomous source, much in the order of this tradition.
The sanctity of contract can be traced to the day when religion and law
were almost indistinguishable.59 The equating of breach of promise to
dishonesty in business "combined to give to contracts a measure of religious
blessedness and to breaches of contract a mark of sinful or unethical aberra-
tion."'6 The morality of promise was the autonomous measure to which the
contract breaker was to be held.
The invocation of morality had the virtue of presenting a definition, which,
if comprehensive, was without a coherent competitor and which could be
used to discipline a quantity of refractory precedent. It escaped serious chal-
lenge for a generation and was not expelled from the law until the middle
of the nineteenth century.'
The coherent competitor that arose in the nineteenth century was found in the
objective theory of contracts as manifested in the reasonable person.
57. HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION
38 n.3 (1993) (citing Gabriel Le Bras, Canon Law, in THE LEGACY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 321,
325-26 (C.G. Crump & E.F. Jacobs eds., 1926)).
58. Id. at 45.
59. "Ihe obligations of religion and of law in the field of promises were in medieval times
almost indistinguishable." SIR DAVID HUGHES PARRY, THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH
LAW 6 (1959). "[lit was not surprising that contracts developed ajuristic blessedness or halo and
were so often regarded as sacred. Their sanctity is directly traceable to their early religious and
ecclesiastical associations ..... Id. at 18.
60. Id. at 8; see also John Witte, Jr., Blest Be the Ties that Bind Covenant and Community
in Puritan Thought, 36 EMORY L.J. 579, 595 (1987) ("[C]ovenant theology also provided the
cardinal ethical principle of Puritanism that each person was free to choose his act, but once
having chosen was bound to perform that act, regardless of the consequences.").
61. PARRY, supra note 59, at 13.
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The replacement of the sacred rituals with the notion of objective
manifestation does not mean that the reasonable person is of recent vintage.
The genesis of the reasonable person can be seen in law's religious ancestors.
Saint Thomas Aquinas saw law as evolving from human reason. "[C]ertain
principles imprinted in [human reason] provide a general standard of
measurement for everything human beings do."'62 One can see the reasonable
person as the embodiment of Aquinas' notion of human reason. This human
reason was to be found not only through divine intervention but also in the
customs found within the human community. In Summa Theologiae, Aquinas
asserts that "law starts with what nature produces, then by use of reason certain
things become customs, and finally things produced by nature and tested by
custom are sanctified with the awe and religious weight of laws."'63 The notion
of collectivity as reflected in custom imbued early juridical thought with an
aura of divine sanctity. One commentator states that "God had also created man
as a communal being."' As members of a community, humans were thought
to have a single consciousness. The reasonable person can be seen as a modem
version of this notion of collectivity or community consciousness. 5
The natural law theorists provide further support to the notion that the
reasonable person's genesis was religiously based. Natural law theory holds that
God has given all humans the ability to determine the rightness of an action.
The reasonable person can be seen as a reflection of the innate, reasoning
person that exists within all human beings. "Natural law would hold that human
beings are logical and reasonable creatures. Thus, the concept of the 'reason-
able person' has been a major guidepost for lawyers. Jurists perceive that
human beings are autonomous and can choose rationally between courses of
action, weighing costs, benefits, and sanctions."' This religious foundation
depicts the reasonable person not as merely a passive receptacle of community
values, but as somewhat of a zealot who's role is to advance legal and commu-
nity values toward a divine ideal. One theologian asserts: "[W]hat good does
62. Aquinas, supra note *, at 421.
63. Id. at 420.
64. Witte, supra note 60, at 599.
65. As equally important as religion, was the belief in magic. "Institutions of private interest
(i.e., personal property and the law of obligations) have developed under the protection... of
magic." PIERRE DE TOURTOULAN, PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 181 (Martha McC.
Read trans., Augustus M. Kelly Publ'rs 1969) (1922). In short, "the law is collective in its reli-
gious and magical roots." Id. at 190. The magical embodiment of the reasonable person was the
medieval sorcerer. The sorcerer became a creation of the collective consciousness. Both the
sorcerer and the reasonable person are community driven beliefs used to support the juridical
function.
66. IRwiN A. HoRowrrz & THOMAS E. WILLGNG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW: INTEGRATIONS
AND APPLICATIONs 22 (1984).
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a law do when it merely interprets social conditions without giving them direc-
tion?"'67
The reasonable person of contract can be seen as a secularized form of the
divine reason or rationality advocated by Augustine and Aquinas. This
secularization or "spiritual commercialism"68 was accelerated by a number of
fundamental philosophical shifts beginning in the eighteenth century. These
secularizing shifts included the decline in faith which lessened the value
attached to ritual formalities,69 the rise of the common law courts, the
separation of church and state, and the demise of the ecclesiastical courts. This
paved the way for the shift away from the search for the divine law and
towards a search for law as a simple reflection of commercial reasonableness.
Two fundamentally non-religious developments also precipitated the rise
of the reasonable person standard. The dramatic rise of mass production with
the advent of the industrial revolution, along with the corresponding rise of
consumerism and the modem market economy, made it impractical for parties
to formalize every detail of their contractual exchanges. The flexibility of the
common law and its receptiveness to ever-changing custom made for a
compatible fit with the new market economies. "The distinctive features of
common law were its evolutionary character, its reliance on custom and
precedent as set forth in written legal decisions, and its flexibility."7
Flexibility can be seen as a close relative to practicality. The market economy
dictated practicality and reasonableness in a legal system. Practicality in a
modem economy required the enforcement of reasonable expectations. Roscoe
Pound explained that the "more highly specialized the division of labor the
more each individual must be secured in the reasonable expectations involved
in his relations with others."'" A closely associated development was the
political and economic rise of individual rights. John Locke72 and Adam
67. ELLUL, supra note 52, at 128-29.
68. Witte, supra note 60, at 589.
69. DuRKHEIM, supra note 8, at 210.
70. RONDO CAMERON, A CONCISE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WORLD: FROM PALEOLITHIC
Tnms TO THE PREsENr 209 (1989). This is not to argue that other legal systems are unable to
provide the needed elements of practicality, flexibility, and reasonableness. The Napoleonic Code
of 1804 was "[w]ritten by middle-class lawyers and jurists" and "specifically sanctioned freedom
of contract and gave valid contracts the force of law." Id. at 211.
71. 5 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 199 (1959).
72. See generally JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Scholar
Press 1970) (1690). The reasonable person can be seen as an egalitarian concept-a reflection of
human reasonableness equally applied to all members of society. ForLocke the state of nature was
a "state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more
than another." John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, in THE GREAT LEGAL
PHILOSOPHERS 137, 137 (Clarence Morris ed., 1959). In the case of dispute between the equal
members of society, it is the community that serves as neutral arbiter. "And thus all private
judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire ......
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Smith73 provided the literature; the industrial revolution and the rise of
democracy provided the means by which the individual took center stage in the
political, economic, and legal arenas. Standards of conduct were no longer to
be provided by God or the king but by the ordinary, reasonable man.
The religiously based sacred rituals and formalities were replaced by the
consensual contract. 74 Businesspersons in a market economy needed to
quickly enter into bilateral agreements with the expectations that they would
create mutually binding and enforceable obligations. "The consensual contract
alone was able at a single stroke to create the two-way track of bonds that we
find in any reciprocal agreement."75 Sacred formality was no longer seen as
an end but as a means to an end. The end was the finding and interpretation
of the consensual wills. Initially this search was focused upon the notion of
consensus ad idem or the actual meeting of the minds. In the twentieth century
the subjective meeting of the minds was objectified into the reasonable person
principle.
B. The Philosophical Reasonable Person
Ihering intimately connected the law with that of general philosophy.76
The objective theory of contract is one attempt at developing a unifying
philosophy for all of contract law. A philosophy of true objectivity would place
all fact patterns into existing decisional constructs. Oliver Wendell Holmes
"provided an apparently convincing demonstration that it was possible to
reduce all principles of liability to a single, philosophically continuous series
and to construct a unitary theory which would explain all conceivable single
Id. at 147. The reasonable person is the community's umpire in the field of contract law.
73. See generally ADAM SMITH, INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSEs OF THm WEALTH
OF NATIONS (1776). "As Adam Smith pointed out more than two centuries ago, division of labor
involves specialization, and specialization leads to greater efficiency and technological progress."
CAMERON, supra note 70, at 25.
74. A contract was formed in the middle ages with the use of formal, sacred rituals. "If the
solemn ritual [was] lacking, there [was] no contract." DURKHEIM, supra note 8, at 200. The idea
of consensual contract was made possible by the sanctifying presence of religious morality. The
solemn nature of contract from Roman times to the Renaissance was religiously based. Contract
was in essence a type of sacrament. To breach one's promise was "committing sacrilege, because
[one is] breaking an oath,... profaning a sacred thing,... committing an act forbidden by
religion." Id. at 209.
75. Id. at 216-17.
76. "The history of law becomes the history of juridical aims, that is, the history of the
philosophy of law." ELLUL, supra note 52, at 32.
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instances."77 The courts merely had to objectively slot each case into one of
the existing constructs.
The will theory of contract failed to prevent the advance of the object-
ivists. The will theory's insistence upon the actual subjective assent of the two
parties was open to a number of criticisms. It failed to philosophically explain
why the will of the parties justified, by itself, the intervention of courts. Why
is the will to exchange morally different than the will to give? If the will as
expressed in a promise is the basis of contractual obligation, then why does
there have to be a communication of that will? "If all promises were binding,
it was not clear that a promise needed to be accepted"78 These shortcomings
of the will theory can essentially be explained as evidentiary problems. The
inherent subjectivity of actual assent makes the burden of proof regarding
consensus ad idem almost insurmountable. It is this burden of proof that led to
the reasonable person's reign over the realm of contractual interpretation.
At first there was an attempt to reconcile the subjective and objective
approaches to mutual assent. The objective theory was offered as an evidentiary
tool for proving the subjective will of the contracting parties. Objective
manifestations could, through a process of reasoning by analogy, provide
insight into a person's actual state of mind. This connection betweenthe mental
and the physical is philosophically known as interactionism. It is the "common-
sense view.., that mental and physical events mutually influence one anoth-
er."
79
Earlier attempts to solve this evidentiary dilemma were posed by the
Romans and subsequently by Thomas Aquinas. The Romans abandoned any
hope of creating a general theory of contract. Instead, they embarked on a
mechanical effort of categorizing contracts. The Romans fashioned different
laws of contracts around each of their different categories. A verbal contract
was made so by the expression of the stipulatio. A promise of a public
donation, a pollicitatio, became another category of enforceable promise. The
formalities used in making a promise needed to fit into one of the categories
for it to be enforceable. The will of the parties was wholly irrelevant.
In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas categorized agreements based
upon their essence. The essence or soul of a contract provided a vehicle to
interpret ambiguities or to fill in any gaps in the agreement. A rationalization
77. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 56 (1977). For an in-depth explanation
of Holmes' principles of liability, see HOLMES, supra note 17, at 5-33. See also Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 417 (1899) (discussing whether
evidence of intent or circumstances should be allowed when interpreting construction of a
writing). See generally Robert L. Birmingham, Holmes on 'Peerless': Raffles v. Wichelhaus and
the Objective Theory of Contract, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 183 (1985) (explaining Holmes' reasoning
in the Raffles decision).
78. GORDLEY, supra note 53, at 79.
79. JoHN HosPERs, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 254 (3d ed. 1988).
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took hold that although the parties had not willed or assented to a contract
term, they had assented to a certain type of contractual relationship. This rela-
tionship in turn had a soul or essence by which questions of interpretation or
enforcement could be judged."0 The contract was to be interpreted not by way
of the reasonable person but by way of the presumed intent of the parties. Lord
Justice Bowen, in the 1889 case of The Moorcock, made a case for this will
theory of implied terms, deciding that in all cases of implied warranties of
covenants in law "'the law is raising an implication from the presumed
intention of the parties with the object of giving to the transaction such efficacy
as both parties must have intended.'.'
The rule of the will theory of implied terms eventually gave way to the
implication of terms through the reasonable person of the objective theory. The
implied terms were primarily an imposition of community standards as
constructed by the reasonable person and not necessarily a reflection of the
general will of the parties. Lord Denning described the potential conflict be-
tween the will theory's implication of intent and the use of the reasonable
person: "Is it right only to imply a term when it is 'necessary' to effectuate the
intent of the parties? or is it permissible to imply it when it is 'reasonable' so
to do in order to do what is fair and just as between the parties?" 2 Twentieth
century contract law has exhibited a willingness to imply reasonable terms not
intended by the parties. Contract law has become, at least partially, to reflect
what society believes is fair. The important jurisprudential result is that contract
has moved from the domain of purely private law to a quasi-public law. The
reasonable person has become its unelected constable.
80. "The parties willed a certain normative relationship ..... Id. at 241. The philosophy of
contractual essence can be seen at work in the 1936 English case of Hain Steamship Co. v. Tate
& Lyle, Ltd., [1936] 2 All E.R. 597 (H.L. 1964). The issue was whether a route deviation of a
chartered ship amounted to a material breach. Lord Atkin held that "the departure from the voyage
contracted to be made is a breach... of such a serious character that however slight the deviation
the other party to the contract is entitled to treat it as going to the root of the contract." Id. at 601
(emphasis added). See also Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., [1962]
2 Q.B. 26,37-38 (1961) (citingHain Steamship, butdeciding Lord Atkins was dealing solely with
deviation). See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REv. 131 (1970)
(proposing a new way of thinking about consumer-transaction contracts).
81. DENNING, supra note 3, at 35 (quoting The Moorcock, 14 P.D. 64, 68 (C.A. 1889)).
82. Id. at 40-41. Lord Denning sees the doctrine of presumed intent as an attempt to rectify
this conflict. The doctrine presumes that the parties would have intended the implication of the
same term as that provided by the reasonable person. The congruency between the implied intent
of the parties and reasonable person intent is likely to increase proportionally with the parties'
knowledge of community or trade standards. Assuming such knowledge, one may imply that the
parties willed these standards into the contract. The rationalization is simple. If the parties found
the generally accepted standards to be contrary to their desires, then they would have opted out
by fashioning specific contractual language dictating otherwise. See id. at 41-53 (discussing the
expansion of presumed intent).
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The difficulty in determining the general will of the parties and the
essence of the contract opened the door for the reasonable person to pass. The
implication of parties' intentions for terms never contemplated began to be
discarded. External standards of fairness and reasonableness were substituted
for the implied will of the partiesY This movement toward the intent of the
reasonable person represented a shift from the is of contract to the ought. The
role of the courts shifted from the discovery of the mystical general will to the
creation of fair and reasonable contracts.
Through its application in the reasonable person standard, the objective
theory can be said to be both descriptive and normative. It focuses on what the
parties actually did and not what they should have done. The devices of custom
and usage provide a descriptive base for contractual interpretation.84 Professor
Greenawalt asserts, however, that legal interpretation is akin to theological
interpretation and is essentially normative. The reasonable person is applied
through the mind of the judicial interpreter. "The interpreter typically will
engage in some normative evaluation when aiming to provide a descriptive
account [of the contractual event]."85 This normative filtering has at times
been described as the notion of sympathy. "When we sympathize with the
other, we open our hearts to his or her subjective predicament, rather than our
minds to his or her behavioral [objective] choices and preferences." 6 The
reasonable person can be defined as being both descriptive and normative.
83. See DURK-miM, supra note 8, at 227 ("A just contract is not simply any contract that is
freely consented to ... it is a contract by which things and services are exchanged at the true and
normal value, in short, at the just value."); Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L.
& COM. 193 (1982) (addressing the growing willingness of courts to modify contracts)
[hereinafter Speidel, Spirit of Contract]; Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and
ConsumerProtection, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 359 (1970) (discussing unconscionability as a defense
to enforcing consumer contracts) [hereinafter Speidel, Unconscionability]. See generally
P.S. Atiyah, Contract and Fair Exchange, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1985), reprinted in P.S.
ATiYAH, ESSAYS ON CoNTRAcT 329-54 (1986) (discussing in modem concerns for fairness in
contracts).
84. In philosophical terms custom and trade usage can be connected to the notion of behavior-
ism. Behaviorism holds that "thoughts are tendencies to behave in certain ways, or dispositions
to behave." HOSPERS, supra note 79, at 248. Businesspersons possess the tendency to behave in
acceptable, uniform ways, which have been codified into a behavioral code, the customs and
usages of their specific business, trade, or profession.
85. GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 75.
86. Robin West, Disciplines, Subjectivity, and Law, in THE FATE OF LAW 119, 153 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 1991). See generally ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS (Augustus M. Kelley Publ'rs 1966) (1759) (exploring the long history of the role of
sympathy in the law). Emile Durkheim saw sympathy as an underlying cause for the development
of doctrines and rules that negate contract enforcement. These rules can be found in the areas of
capacity, illegality, and reality of consent. "The feelings of sympathy that we usually have for our
fellow-creatures are outraged when suffering is inflicted on someone when it is in no way
deserved." DuRKHIM, supra note 8, at 223.
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Although descriptively based, the reasonable person is subject to a normative
application. The application to specific parties is both a confirmation of what
they intended and what society believes they should have intended.
The effectiveness of the reasonable person rests upon the human ability to
quantify knowledge. The reasonable person is premised upon the certainty of
knowledge. Bertrand Russell in The Problems of Philosophy stated the problem
of reasonableness: "Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that
no reasonable man could doubt it? '87 In order to determine what is reason-
able, we must first begin with a knowledge of acceptable behavior. The
problem is the divergence between appearance and reality. "In daily life, we
assume as certain many things which, on a closer scrutiny, are found to be so
full of apparent contradictions that only a great amount of thought enables us
to know what it is that we really may believe." 8 The success of the reason-
able person is based upon the ability to narrow the gap between reality and
appearance.
Immanuel Kant's notion of the reasonable person shifts the focus away
from external objectivity and towards an inner subjectivity. He perceived the
reasonable person as embodied within the rational being existing in all of us.
For Kant, a purely objective reasonable person was a diminishment of the
complete human. Kant "based his solution on inner experience, on the
subjective consciousness of duty or obligation." 9 The abstracting of a
reasonable person from manifestations of reality remains a facsimile of that
reality.9" By accommodating subjectivity within the reasonable person, the gap
between apparent and actual may be narrowed. Kant's incarnation of the
reasonable person is the impartial spectator who like the reasonable person, is
a disinterested judge who's aim is to produce harmonious relationships. John
Rawls updated the notion of an impartial spectator with his notion of the veil
of ignorance." The reasonable person should hide behind a veil of anonymity
applying community standards to prince and pauper alike.
John Finnis in his work on natural law theory speaks of practical
reasonableness as a basic human value. This value dictates that all human
beings should seek "to bring an intelligent and reasonable order into one's own
87. BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 7 (1969) (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. DAvID GRANFIELD, THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY
21(1988).
90. One faction in modem philosophy holds that objectivity is a myth. The subjectiveness of
human perception cannot be divorced from the interpretation of objective facts. Professor Frug
has called into question the philosophical soundness of a pure objective theory of contract. "[O]ne
can never discover 'facts' without simultaneously engaging in an act of interpretation." Gerald E.
Frug, A Critical Theory of Law, 1 LEGAL EDUC. RPv. 43, 47 (1989).
91. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).
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actions and habits and practical attitudes."' Each one of us should conform
our decisions to the reasonable person that dwells in each of us. The internal
reasonable person acts to influence a person's behavior so that it conforms to
the standards of the external reasonable person. Both the internal and external
reasonable person suggest that their human personages honor their contractual
obligations.
C. Psychoanalyzing the Reasonable Person
The reasonable person can be seen as a product of psychology' and,
therefore, subject to psychoanalysis. The creation of the reasonable person is
an intentional activity. The process of contractual interpretation is guided by
the courts' intent to give meaning to a transaction or a relationship. The
psychology of human perception necessarily makes this process a selective one.
The intent of the interpreter will determine the variables on which the
reasonable person's attention is focused. "An intention is a turning of one's
attention toward something.... The selective.., character of perception is
one aspect of intentionality: I cannot look at one thing at this instant without
refusing to look at another."'94 Thus, there is a binary relationship between the
objective facts of a contract and how those facts are seen and interpreted by the
reasonable person. We "cannot perceive something until [we] can conceive
it."95 The interpreter, through the reasonable person's conception of contract,
will determine how to perceive a given contractual event or fact pattern.
Pierre de Tourtoulan argued that psychological influences upon the law
work at both the individual and collective levels. The notion of reasonableness
is a product of a collective consciousness. The tools used to construct the
reasonable person, such as usage, custom, and language, are products of this
group consciousness. "The group can have but a single mind, a single
consciousness. From it the individuals imbibe their beliefs, and consequently
these beliefs are always allowable and even obligatory."9" The complexities
of human personality are also reflected in the personality of the reasonable
person. Psychologist Henry Murray examines the complexity of individuality
in his notion of personology.97 Part and parcel to the notion of personology
is the need for roleship. The role to be fulfilled by the reasonable person is
92. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 88 (1980).
93. DE TOURTOULAN, supra note 65, at 207 ("Law is a psychological product. If we abandon
the attempt to study it through psychology, we abandon the attempt to understand its true nature
in order to content ourselves with observing its various manifestations.").
94. ROLLO MAY, LovE AND WILL 236 (1969).
95. Id.
96. DE TOURTOULAN, supra note 65, at 184.
97. See generally CALVIN S. HALL & GARDNER LiNDZsy, THEORIES OF PERSONALrrY 194 (2d
ed. 1970) (discussing Murray's theory of personology).
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pivotal to the way the reasonable person is fabricated and applied. Is the
reasonable person's role primarily to determine what the parties intended or
what they would have intended if aware of a contractual issue when forming
the contract? Or is the reasonable person's role to look to society, to determine
what feels reasonable, and apply that standard to the fact pattern regardless of
the intent of the parties?
The terminology of psychology can be applied to the law of contracts. For
example, many of the thematic symbols of contract can be seen as iconic
images. Once the icons of contract are learned they continue to render a strong
afterimage in the judicial mind. The reasonable person standard is one of the
icons of contract. The fabrication of a reasonable person is supposed to be
performed on an ad hoc basis. Once constructed, however, the reasonable
person continues as an afterimage in the judicial mind. A reasonable person
thus becomes a culmination of previous fabrications. The earlier fabrications
provide the basis for mutation by the idiosyncrasies of the pending case. Once
brought to the conscious mind, the ghost of a past reasonable person triggers
a preconceived bundle of beliefs and rationales." The tools of imagery, such
as analogues, coding, symbolization, iconic memory, and masking, are used to
bring a degree of coherence to the complexity and the enormity of contract
law. It is the symbolization of contract law that allows the practitioner and the
jurist to structure law's content into a functional form. The symbolic litany of
contract includes consensus ad idem, freedom of contract, infant incapacity,
good faith, unconscionability, and the reasonable person. The reasonable person
is a symbol of impartiality, of contracts' objectivity, and of community values.
The formulation of the reasonable person is an .attempt to bridge the gap
between external manifestation and private internalization of manifestation
through perception. "The problem is to find a way of correlating these
symbols ... with the objects attributed to the world external to the perceiv-
er.''99 The reasonable person can be seen as a coding system for ordering the
external world of contracts. If the law is viewed as an object, then the benefits
of psychological research can be utilized to better understand the mechanics of
the reasonable person.
Despite the relevancy of psychological insight, the relationship between
psychology and law has been a hostile one. The basis of this conflict is the
perceived divergence of their philosophical underpinnings."u June Tapp, in
summarized the differences in methods utilized by various fields, noting that
"law is deductive, psychology is inductive; law is doctrinal, psychology is
98. This phenomenon is called masking. Masking is the process by which "perceptions contin-
ue although external stimulation has ceased." Paul A. Kolers, Perception and Representation, 34
ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 129, 136 (1983). In the case of the reasonable person, the image is internal
and continues internally beyond its original application.
99. Id. at 155.
100. HoRowrrz & WILLGiNG, supra note 66, at 18.
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empirical.'' °. Horowitz and Willging distinguish the methods employed by
each as follows:
Common law prefers decisions easily justified to a public that sees courts
as having a limited role in making policy. Judges, therefore, show decided
preference for custom and history. Psychological science tends to pay much
less attention to historical precedents; its acceptability to courts, for these
and other reasons, is somewhat tentative. 02
For the psychologists, the law's characterization of itself as objective is
more of a fiction. It can be argued that the ad hoe objectiveness of psychology
poses a threat to law's adherence to precedent and to the flexible use of its
reasonable person standard to render justice in a particular case. Nonetheless,
if contract law is to be true to its self-proclaimed creed of objectivity, it will
have to continue to incorporate the work product of applied psychology and the
other social sciences.
D. The Judicial Mind and the Reasonable Person
The reasonable person is intimately connected with the judicial mind, for
it is in this mind that the reasonable person is concocted. Within the judicial
mind, the parameters of reasonableness are formed. For Oliver Wendell
Holmes, this dictated an objective assessment of community standards and
values. In Holmes' community-dictated approach, the roles of the judge and the
reasonable person were to objectively determine which community values and
standards applied. It is the rule of the majority as determined by the majority.
This approach places the role of the judge within a very cold, objective world.
The progress of contract law is measured by its ability to reach a set of legal
rules in which liability "must go by externals," being formal, objective stan-
dards. °3 Justice Holmes can be seen as the patron saint of the reasonable
person standard.
The reasonable person can also be seen as a product of an interpretive
community. The reasonable person is not so much the creation of a judge but
of the community of judges.
Legal decision-makers operate within a legal system that they both inherit
and construct. The fact that they inherit it means that their decisions cannot
adequately be understood as subjective, and the fact that they construct it
means that their decisions cannot adequately be understood as objective.
The relationship between legal decision-makers and the legal system is far
101. Id.
102. Id. at 19.
103. HOLMES, supra note 17, at 242; see GLMORE, supra note 77, at 49.
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too complex to be captured by either the concept of objectivity or subjectiv-
ity.
04
Professor Owen Fiss asserts that judges are part of an interpretive community
that influences each judge's interpretive processes. Each judge's construction
of the reasonable person is constrained by institutional rules found within the
judicial community. The objective reasonable person is one constrained by a
bounded objectivity. 5 The constraints of the institutional rules of contract
interpretation and the judicial community act to transform "the interpretive
process from a subjective to an objective one. ''""e De Tourtoulan concisely
states that "law is a social affair." The fabrication of the reasonable person is
a phenomena of both individual and collective psychology.
III. FABRICATING THE REASONABLE PERSON
Professor Corbin stated some eighty years ago that in the "law of contract
as in the law of tort, men are expected to live up to the standard of the
reasonably prudent man."' 7 Professor Prosser notes that the reasonable
person of tort is a hypothetical personification of the "community ideal of
reasonable behavior."'0 8 Although stemming from the same family tree, the
reasonable person of contract differs in make-up and disposition. In tort the
reasonable person is a more universalized personage, reflective of the general
duties of care owed to fellow human beings. The reasonable person of contract
is a more specialized creature, possessing all of the idiosyncratic features of the
contracting parties viewed within the context of their interaction. 9 The
104. Frug, supra note 90, at 52-53; see also Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in
Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986) (describing the judging
process as a conflict between the law and a judge's desired end position).
105. See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982). Fiss
states that "[b]ounded objectivity is the only kind of objectivity to which the law.., ever
aspires." Id. at 745.
106. Id. at 745. Fiss states that interpretation "makes law possible ... [and there is] the
possibility of an inter-subjective meaning rooted in the idea of disciplining rules and of an
interpretive community." Id. at 750.
107. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26
YALE L.J. 169, 205 (1917); cf PROSSER, supra note 2, §§ 32-33 (the reasonable person of tort).
108. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 32, at 151.
109. It should be noted the subjective idiosyncrasies of the person involved in a tort are also
taken into account.
[T]he courts have made allowance not only for the external facts, but sometimes for
certain characteristics of the actor himself, and have applied ... a more or less
subjective standard. Depending on the context, therefore, the reasonable person
standard may, in fact, combine in varying measure both objective and subjective
ingredients.
19971
25
DiMatteo: The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SoUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
reasonable person is not often a reflection of the ordinary, reasonable person.
Instead, the reasonable person is more concerned with what people actually do
in a specific marketplace. Courts look to a number of sources in constructing
the contractual reasonable person. These sources include the characteristics of
the parties, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the formation of the
contract, and evidence of pertinent custom and trade usage. In essence, the
reasonable person is constructed from the background of the transaction or
relationship. Philosopher John Dewey studied the importance of background to
interpersonal meaning and understanding. "If two persons can converse
intelligently with each other, it is because a common experience supplies a
background of mutual understanding upon which their respective remarks are
projected."
'"0
This background gives meaning to contracts and allows the reasonable
person to be constructed. A properly constructed reasonable person enables the
court to complete the spaces of an incomplete contract. Through the reasonable
person the court can extrapolate a second-order intent."' This second-order
intent stems from the primary intent expressed by the parties or it may be
derived from the courts imposition of an appropriate solution. This second-ord-
er intent is determined by imbuing the reasonable person with the knowledge
of what the parties knew and what they should have known. "[A] contract shall
have the meaning that a reasonable person would give it under the circum-
stances under which it was made, if he knew everything he should plus
everything the parties actually knew. '". We now turn to an analysis of how
the courts determine what the parties knew and what they should have known.
A. The Parties and the Totality of the Circumstances
In determining what a reasonable person in the position of the contracting
parties would have intended, the courts first look to the specific characteristics
of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the formation of their contract.
The sophistication of the parties, including their personal or institutional
understanding of the meaning of a particular contractual event will generally
be the first level of analysis. A Canadian court in Lloyd's Bank Canada v.
William Prosser, The Law of Torts, in THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF LAW 450 (Patricia Smith
ed., 1993). The courts often take into account the physical attributes, mental capacity, age, and
education of the alleged tortfeasor.
110. JOHN DEWEY, How WE THiK 214 (Prometheus Books 1991) (1910).
111. Professor Dennis Patterson describes a spectrum of intentional states ranging from primary
(express) to second-order intent. The secondary intentional states are derived from what is
"consistentwith the composite ofsecondary intentions associated with the community orpractice."
Patterson, supra note 25, at 252.
112. Slawson, supra note 34, at 38.
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Canada Life Insurance Co."' stated that "it is not only the meaning of
the [words] but the understanding of the... meaning of the[m] ... that is
relevant.""' 4 The sophistication, knowledge, and experiences of the contract-
ing parties become pivotal elements in the construction of the reasonable
person. In Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative v. Amoco Tax Leas-
ing,"5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit placed a
strong emphasis upon the sophistication of the parties in precluding the
introduction of evidence of an alternative reasonable meaning. The fact that the
parties were large, specialized corporations represented by sophisticated law
firms who drafted "a complex and detailed fifty-seven page contract" narrowed
the reasonable person."6
The sophistication and expertise of the contracting parties includes not
only actual but also imputed knowledge. A typical source of imputed
knowledge derives from the fact that most commercial transactions rarely
proceed without the benefit of legal counsel. The timing and content of legal
advice should be an added ingredient in the fabrication of the reasonable
person. More broadly, the cumulative knowledge of the different members of
a company, including all types of professional advice, should enter into the
reasonable person inquiry. The reasonable person is a creation of both
inter-party (between contracting parties) and intra-party (within a contracting
party) communications. This type of analysis becomes increasingly important
as the party-specific analysis moves from dealings between individuals to those
between large corporations.
Beyond the four comers of the contract and the party-specific analysis, the
courts often look to the totality or surrounding circumstances of the contract.
"One rule of construction ... is to give effect to the intention of the parties in
light of all the surrounding circumstances."' 7 The court in In re Westing-
113. No. 18929/87, 1991 Canada LEXIS 1015 (Ont. C.J. Oct. 11, 1991).
114. ld. at *12.
115. 34 F.3d 1310 (7th Cir. 1994).
116. Id. at 1317. See also Zidenburg v. Greenberg, No. 70300/912, 1993 Canada Lexis 2157
(Ont. C.J. Aug. 24, 1993) (experienced and sophisticated parties).
117. Kreis v. Venture Out In America, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 482, 484 (E.D. Tenn. 1973)
(emphasis added). "mhe Courts cannot only look to the language of the contract but must
ascertain, if possible, the intention of the parties and make a construction that is fair and
reasonable." Id. The notion of totality has long been a part of contract law. "'The intention of the
parties can only be deduced from the totality of the evidence."' ROBERT LOWE, COMMERCIAL
LAW 92 (6th ed. 1983) (quoting Heilbut, Symons & Co. v. Buckleton, [1913] App. Cas. 30, 51
(1912) (appeal taken from Eng.) (emphasis added). "A word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according
to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,425 (1918)
(Holmes, J.) (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 20 cmt. b ("[M]aterial
differences of meaning are a standard cause of contract disputes, and the decision of such disputes
necessarily requires interpretation of the language and other conduct of the parties in the light of
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house Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation"8 stated the party-spec-
ific, event-specific analysis the courts typically look to in fabricating the
reasonable person. The reasonable person is to be "determined by the totality
of the circumstances, including the comparative abilities of the parties to make
informed judgments... [party-specific]; each party's interest... ; and the
extent to which that interest was a factor in the negotiation of the contract
[event-specific]."".9
The reasonable person is cut from the fabric of facts and is thus intimately
connected with the totality of the circumstances. It is from this totality that the
facts are distilled. The totality timeline of modem contract law is much more
expansive than the one found in classical contract theory. Classical contract's
fixation with the moment of creation limited the scope of sources used in
constructing the reasonable person. Modem contract law has expanded the
reasonable person's viewfinder to include any event that may shed light upon
contractual intent. The courts look to the facts of prior dealings, 2 ' to
pre-contractual negotiations,'2 ' along with post-formation inquiries into the
course of performance," and to contractual modification."
The reasonable person's analysis of the totality of the circumstancesbegins
with the contract itself. If the contract is facially unambiguous, then the
objective theory mandates that the words of the contract be given their plain
and ordinary meaning. 24 "A written contract which is expressed in clear and
the circumstances.") (emphasis added).
118. 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981).
119. Id. at 456 (emphasis added); see also The Sale of Goods Act, 1979, ch. 54 (Eng.). In
determining the passage of title the courts shall pay regard "to the terms of the contract, the
conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case." Id. § 17(2).
120. The Restatement expressly adopts the use of prior dealings, agreements, and negotiations
as an aide to interpretation. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 202; see also U.C.C. § 1-205(1)
(1989) (defining course of dealing as the "sequence of previous conduct between the parties...
which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting
their expressions and other conduct").
121. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217 (1987); see also G. Richard Shell,
Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of
Action, 44 VAND. L. REv. 221 (1991) (regulation of precontractual opportunism and a new cause
of action called "Opportunistic Breach of the Bargaining Relationship").
122. Section 2-208(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code defines course of performance as "any
course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine
the meaning of the agreement." U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1989). Such acceptance may constitute a
waiver of a contractual term. See U.C.C. § 2-208(3) (1989).
123. See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term
Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1985); see Speidel, Spirit of Contract, supra note 83, at 193;
Ronald M. DeKoven, Comment, Modification of a Contract in New York: Criteria for
Enforcement, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 173 (1967); Robert W. Reeder, III, Comment, Court-Imposed
Modifications, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079 (1983).
124. Artex, Inc. v. Omaha Edible Oils, Inc. 436 N.W.2d 146, 150 (Neb. 1989) ("There is a
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unambiguous language is not subject to interpretation or construction."'" The
paradigmatic, fully-integrated written contract limits and at times eliminates the
workings of the reasonable person. As we move away from the fully-integrated
instrument to more informal writings and oral contracts, the clarity of the
words becomes increasingly suspect.'26 The totality of the circumstances as
seen through the eyes of the reasonable person will be used to give legal conse-
quence to the words of the contract. An Official Comment to Section 1-205 of
the Uniform Commercial Code states that the language found in a contract shall
be "read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other
surrounding circumstances."'27
Contextual evidence stemming from course of dealings, pre-contractual
negotiations, and course of performance may be used to determine the meaning
of the contract. The Restatement provides that courts may look at the
transaction "in all its length and breadth" in fabricating the reasonable per-
son.' Prior dealings can be used to determine if the parties have created a
common understanding unique to their relationship. Through the use of the
reasonable person standard, the courts will often recognize such tacit under-
standings by supplying omitted terms. "[T]acit agreement or a common tacit
assumption" may provide enough interpretive guidance for a court to imply a
missing term.2 9 Prior dealings, in effect, become a part of the transaction in
question.
The objective meaning of a contract's language can give way to a different
meaning procured from a totality analysis. "Even though words seem on their
face to have only a single possible meaning, other meanings often appear when
the circumstances are disclosed."'3 The circumstances of course of dealing,
pre-contract negotiations, and course of performance provide the bases for a
more specific, inter-subjective meaning. The Uniform Commercial Code
acknowledges that the performance phase of a contract may provide the
reasonable person insight into this alternative meaning.' Course of perfor-
strong presumption that a written instrument correctly expresses the intention of the parties to it.").
125. Id; see, e.g., Bedrosky v. Hiner, 430 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Neb. 1988); Fisbeck v. Scherbarth,
Inc., 428 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Neb. 1988); Lueder Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Elec. Sys., 424 N.W.2d
126, 128 (Neb. 1988).
126. Statements may be categorized into four groups: mere puff (noncontractual), condition
precedents, representations, and contractual terms. See LowE, supra note 117, at 92-102.
127. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (1989) (emphasis added).
128. RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 212 cmt. b.
129. Id. § 204 cmt. c. The parties often create a language unique to their relationship. Through
a course of dealing they imply a "tacit recognition" to a specific meaning pertaining to contractual
language. See id. § 223 cmt. b.
130. Id. § 214 cmt. b.
131. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1989). The rationale for the use of course of performance
evidence was aptly explained in this comment. "The parties themselves know best what they have
meant by their words of agreement and their action under that agreement is the best indication of
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mance conduct can serve an evidentiary function in proving one party's
knowledge of the other party's understanding. The Restatement concludes that
"[s]tatements of a contracting party subsequent to the adoption of an integration
are admissible against him to show his understanding of the meaning asserted
by the other party."'
Section nineteen of the Restatement speaks of the "operative meaning" of
a particular contract or transaction. This is not a meaning implied by society,
law, custom, or usage. It is the meaning found within the context or totality of
the transaction. "[T]he operative meaning is found in the transaction and its
context rather than in the law or in the usages of people other than the
parties."'3 One can argue that it is a step back from a purely objective theory
of interpretation. The impartial reasonable person is not simply viewing the
transaction from without. The reasonable person is allowed to affix a meaning
from within the transaction. It is not so much a diminishment of the reasonable
person, but a recognition of a number of different fabrications of the reasonable
person. Operative meaning is only possible when the totality of the circum-
stances or context of the transaction provides insight into a unique meaning or
common understanding. The reasonable person can be used to determine the
existence of that meaning or understanding. In essence, the undefined operative
meaning allows the reasonable person to weigh both objective and subjective
elements of evidence. If subjective elements or special circumstances fail to
uncover an operative meaning, then the court will fall back to the more
traditional reasonable person analysis which finds guidance in external
standards such as "the usages of people other than the parties."'34
The sweep of the totality of the circumstances analysis and its resultant
input into the fabrication of the reasonable person has been the center of
debate. Should the analysis be limited to the circumstances surrounding the
formation of the contract? May subsequent events be used as an aid in
contractual interpretation? The House of Lords addresses this issue in the case
of L. Schuler A.G. v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd.'35 This is a case of
a technical breach of contract at variance with an implied modification of the
term being breached by subsequent conduct. The contractual term in question
required the selling agent to visit prospective purchasers on a weekly basis as
a condition of the agency contract. In fact, the agent's practice varied regarding
the frequency of such visits. Lord Wilberforce determined that "evidence may
be admitted of surrounding circumstances or in order to explain technical
expressions or to identify the subject matter of an agreement or ... to resolve
what that meaning was." U.C.C. § 2-208 emt. 1 (1989).
132. RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 212 cmt. c.
133. Id. § 212 cmt. a.
134. Id.
135. [1974] App. Cas. 235 (1973) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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a latent ambiguity."' 36 The facts of the case did not fit into any of the
categories created by Lord Wilberforce in his tripartite classification of
situations in which surrounding circumstances may be entered into evidence.
Lord Simon argued for an expanded totality of the circumstances analysis
as a new general rule of contracts. He argued that modem contractual
relationships require a loosening of the overly pedantic evidentiary rules.
Extrinsic evidence should be more widely admitted to prove both contractual
intent and whether there has been a modification of that intent.
[The distinction between the admissibility of direct and circumstantial evi-
dence of intention seems to me to be quite unjustifiable in these days. And
the distinctions between patent ambiguities, latent ambiguities and equivoca-
tions as regards admissibility of extrinsic evidence are based on outmoded
and highly technical and artificial rules and introduce absurd refine-
ments.
137
The long-term nature of many modem day contracts makes it necessary for
courts to view all of the evidence before making their determinations.
Contractual formation in the relational context becomes only one event in a
long-term contractual process. This evolutionary process continuously refines,
expands, and modifies the contractual relationship. The truncating of the
reasonable person inquiry to the moment of contract formation may be
conducive to the discovery of intent in the transactional contract situation, but
it results in a disservice in the context of long-term, relational contracts. The
most attractive attribute of the reasonable person standard is its inherent
flexibility. The standard is constructed on a case by case basis in the search for
truth and reasonableness. This flexibility should be coupled with an opening of
the evidentiary floodgates in order for the reasonable person standard to
maintain its vitality in the modem age of contract.
The totality analysis encompasses all the sources of contractual evidence.
In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,13 Judge Skelly Wright
136. Id. at 261. Lord Reid agreed with Lord Wilberforce that evidence of subsequent mis-
conduct should be excluded. "I find no substantial support in the authorities for any general [rule
for] permitting subsequent act[s] of the parties ... to be used as throwing light on [a contract's]
meaning." Id. at 252. His rationale was that such a rule would open the floodgates of extrinsic
evidence and lead to the demise of the sanctity of the written contract. The floodgate argument
was made by the plaintiff's attorney.
If subsequent conduct is admissible, it may be asked why not admit [evidence of
the] negotiations between the parties? To adopt such a policy would entail the law
embarking on a slippery slope on which there is no halting place. It would be the end
of certainty in relation to the construction of documents.
Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 268.
138. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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described the interrelationship of the facts and circumstances of the case, the
language of the contract, and the importance of usage and practice.
In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary concern must be
with the terms of the contract considered in the light of the circumstances
existing when the contract was made. The test is not simple, nor can it be
mechanically applied. The terms are to be considered "in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular
trade or case."'
139
This review envisions a hierarchy of analysis beginning with the written terms
of the contract, along with the circumstances surrounding its formation as
viewed against the backdrop of usage and practice.
An Aside: The Main Purpose Doctrine
The reasonable person is not only utilized to determine the issue of
reasonableness but also the issue of materiality. The area of breach of contract
often focuses upon the difference between fundamental and minor breach. 4'
One test that has been utilized is whether the breach affects the root or main
purpose of the contract. The court in Cehave N. V v. Bremer Handelsgesell-
schaft4 ' dealt with the issue of fundamental breach. The contract provided
for the delivery of citrus pellets to be shipped in "good condition." A portion
of the shipment was damaged. Lord Denning invoked the guidance of the
commercial man in making his determination on the issue of merchantability.
It was for the commercial man to determine if the nonconformity fundamental-
ly affected "the purpose for which goods of that kind [were] commonly
bought" or used.'42 Denning focused upon the fact that the goods were
resold and used for the same purpose as anticipated in the contract. The court
concluded that to the reasonable commercial person the "breach did not go to
the root of the contract."'
43
139. Id. at 450 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-302 cnt. 1 (1989)).
140. This area of contract also includes the notion of anticipatory breach. Is the party anticipat-
ing a breach reasonable as to that anticipation? What type of information is required for the
reasonable person to properly anticipate a breach? When is it reasonable for a party to require
adequate assurances before commencing with performance? What type of assurances are to be
considered adequate and reasonable? See generallyU.C.C. § 2-609 (1) (1989) ("When reasonable
grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may in
writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may
if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received the
agreed return.").
141. [1976] Q.B. 44 (C.A. 1975).
142. Id. at 62.
143. Id. at 61 (emphasis added). But see Arcos Ltd. v. E.A. Ronaasen & Son, 149 L.T.R. 98
(H.L. 1933) (stating the presumption of reasonableness as to breach and merchantability can be
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The courts have essentially expanded the reasonable person analysis from
a literal interpretation of contractual language towards an ever expanding
totality analysis. The main purpose or root of a contract can have an impact
upon how a court interprets or constructs individual contractual terms. This
principle was enunciated over one hundred years ago in the case of Glynn v.
Margetson.'4 In the process of judicial construction a court is to look "at the
whole of the instrument, and seeing what one must regard... as its main
purpose, one must reject words.., if they are inconsistent with what one
assumes to be the main purpose of the contract."'45 The clear meaning of a
contract term may be discounted under the fiction of presumed intent. The
parties could not have intended to incorporate a term that goes against the
essence or root of their contract.'46 The court stated that "the contractual
intention is to be ascertained-notjust grammatically from words used, but by
consideration of those words in relation to commercial purpose (or other
purpose according to the type of contract)."' 47 This is the presumed intent not
of the parties but that of the reasonable person.
B. Custom and Trade Usage: The Reasonable Person -s a Working Person
The reasonable person can be said to be mainly a creature of custom.4
preempted by express agreement of the parties). The courts are likely to strictly construe any such
language that allows for rejection of a reasonable performance. This rule of strict construction was
aptly explained by Lord Reid in Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime S.A. v. N. V
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale, [1966] 1 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 529 (H.L. 1966). "Such clauses
must be construed strictly and if ambiguous the narrower meaning will be taken.... But if some
limitation has to be read in it seems reasonable to suppose that neither party had in contemplation
a breach which goes to the root of the contract." Id. at 544. (emphasis added). That is, it would
seem reasonable to the reasonable person. Thus, to overcome the presumption of reasonableness
the parties must make "no room in [their] contract for any elasticity." Arcos Ltd., 149 L.T.R. at
99. The parties may thusly convert a minor breach into a fundamental one by making it a
fundamental term in the contract. For an explanation of the distinction between fundamental
breach and the breach of afundamental term see SuisseAtlantique, [1966] 1 Lloyd's List L. Rep.
at 541.
144. 69 L.T.R. I (H.L. 1893).
145. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
146. "One may safely say that the parties cannot... have contemplated that the clause should
have so wide an ambit as in effect to deprive one party's [performance] of all contractual
force .... " Suisse Atlantique, [1966] 1 Lloyd's List L. Rep. at 562. One may fashion an
argument upon another rationale. A literal construction would render the contract illusory. If one
party can be insulated from any liability for failure to give reciprocal performance, then the
contract is not a contract at all.
147. Id. at 564.
148. This is true because the reasonable person is a legal person. Contract law itself, especially
in its common law garb, is a reflection of community customs and values. "[Tihe law of contracts
reflects, in an imperfect way, the needs and values of the communit[y] it serves." Richard E.
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As such, the reasonable person is not one of static intellect. This is because
custom and trade usage is forever changing.' 49 Savigny's historical school
viewed law as a mirrored reflection of custom. "This school saw the law as an
expression of the 'folk spirit' and it was the task of state law to capture [what]
had been exhibited in the freely developed customs of the community.
' 'I 5°
The reasonable person is required to continue to learn about the customs and
usages of a given community.' The court in Larwin-Southern California,
Inc. v. JGB Investment Co., observed that "custom and usage within [a] trade
may... properly be used in clarifying what, on the face of a contract, appears
to be an ambiguity."'52  Section 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code
states that a "usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expecta-
tion that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question."'5 It
is the knowledge that all reasonable persons are expected to possess. Through
this knowledge, "provisions... unclear or ambiguous to a layman [are]
nevertheless clear and succinct to those cognizant of the customs, practices,
usages and terminology" in a particular industry.'54
Speidel, Contract Law: Some Reflections Upon Commercial Context and the Judicial Process,
1967 Wis. L. REv. 822, 822; see also James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers
Confuse Custom and Reason?, 58 U. CHI. L. Rv. 1321 (1991) (reviewing the mingling and
evolution of custom, reason, and the common law from their ancestry in the middle ages to the
time of the American Revolution). For an example of the role of custom and trade usage in the
supranational arena, see Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L, REv. 613
(1989).
149. For an example of the notion of trade usage in a particular industry, see Robert S. Miller,
America Singing: The Role of Custom and Usage in the Thoroughbred Horse Business, 74 KY.
L.J. 781, 796 (1986) ("[T]he sovereign ... is free to recognize that the 'imperfect communities'
that operate beneath the umbrella of the greater community have a role to play in their own gover-
nance.").
150. Martin P. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century
America-Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441, 446 (1986).
151. Custom and trade usage can reach back to Roman Law, to the Law Merchant, and to the
usages developed by the specific parties. "Usages change over time, and persons in close
association often develop temporary usages peculiar to themselves." RESTATEMENT, supra note
37, § 219 cmt. a. This is the language of business that allows the parties to communicate.
152. 162 Cal. Rptr. 52, 57 (Ct. App. 1979).
153. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1989); see Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade:
An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible Rule, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 515 (1981); see also Amy H.
Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage, "Express Terms," and
Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 N.C. L. REv. 777 (1986)
(examining various approaches courts have adopted in interpreting § 1-205(4)).
154. Lipschutz v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 373 F. Supp. 375, 388 (S.D. Tex. 1974); see also
Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("An
'ambiguous' word or phrase is one capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively
by a reasonably intelligent person who ... is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and
terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or business.").
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The reasonable person provides needed flexibility in a contracts regime
that often emphasizes strict rule application. The result is a duality of change.
Change may be engineered through a reformulation of common law contract
rules by way of judicial manipulation or by statutory preemption. Alternatively,
the personage of the reasonable person may be reinvented to reflect changes in
custom and society in general. Either way the end result is a fundamental
change in the common law's decisional matrix. The court in Lipschutz v.
Gordon Jewelry Corp. acknowledged this duality of change when it declared
that "[a] custom [is] a practice which by its universality ... has acquired the
force and effect of law."' 155
1. A Reason to Know: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the
Reasonable Person
The imprimatur of the reasonable person can be seen throughout the
Restatement and the Uniform Commercial Code. It can be seen wherever
reference is made to the fact that a party had reason to know or should have
known. A comment to Section 19 of the Restatement states a person has a
reason to know any "information from which a person of [similar] intelligence
would infer that the fact in question does or will exist."'5 6 In contrast, the
term should know is generally associated with a legal duty to obtain certain
knowledge. "'Should know' imports a duty to others to ascertain facts."'5 7
The determination of whether a party had reason to know is accomplished
within the framework of a totality of the circumstances analysis. It is a factual
determination based upon the circumstances and information available to the
parties." 8 The should know is a judicial determination of what is a reasonable
level of knowledge given the parties and the circumstances. The reasonable
person wears two hats in the reason to know-should know duality. The first is
a party-specific objectivity; the second is a community focused objectivity. In
the community-based gaze of the reasonable person, "it may be reasonable to
hold a nonmerchant to mercantile standards if he is represented by a mercantile
agent."'5 9 Thus, the circumstances of a contract may not only be used to
imply through the reasonable person what the parties had reason to know, but
155. Lipschutz, 373 F. Supp. at 387.
156. REsTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 19 cmt. b; see also Jay M. Feinman, PromisoryEstoppel
and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 712-16 (1984) (reason to know as a mediating
concept).
157. RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 19 cmt. b. Should know l nowledge is relatively
unconcerned with the actual knowledge of the contracting parties.
158. "'Reason to know' depends not only on the words or other conduct, but also on the
circumstances, including previous communications ofthe parties and the usages of their communi-
ty or line of business." Id. § 26 cmt. a.
159. Id. § 221 cmt. b.
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also what they should have known. The parties should know those practices
and usages that are "regularly observed" in their business or trade. 6 '
Section 41 of the Restatement provides an example of the codification of
the reasonable person into law and the relationship between the reasonable
person and existing custom. It provides guidance regarding the determination
of whether a certain lapse of time has rendered an offer inoperative and at-
tempts to answer the issue of what is a reasonable time for an offer to remain
viable.
The circumstances to be considered have a wide range: they include the
nature of the proposed contract, the purposes of the parties, the course of
dealing between them, and any relevant usages of trade. In general, the
question is what time would be thought satisfactory to the offeror by a
reasonable man in the position of the offeree ....161
In many ways the reasonable person is the alter ego of custom. Some practice
or usage that has risen to the level of custom is likely to become embodied in
the reasonable person. "[C]ommercial acceptance by regular observance makes
out a prima facie case that a usage of trade is reasonable.' 62 Custom and
trade usage are ready-made characteristics of the reasonable person.
2. The Reasonable Person as a Precursor
Change in the law of contracts may first enter through the back door.
Commercial reality as exhibited through usage and custom will often be
reflected in the fabrication of the reasonable person. This transformation of the
reasonable person is likely to precede the reformulation of the rules of contract.
Custom and usage as reflected in the reasonable person can be seen as a vehicle
by which the common law has amended itself to accommodate changing times.
Justice Turley in the 1842 case of Jacob v. State63 described the grassroots
metamorphosis of contract law through changes in custom.
[The] sources [of the common law] are to be found in the usage, habits,
manners, and customs of a people.... The common law of a country
will ... be modified, and extended by analogy, construction and custom,
so as to embrace new relations, springing up from time to time, from an
amelioration or change of society."
160. See id. § 222. The Restatement states that "[a] usage of trade is [something] having such
regularity of observance... as to justify an expectation that it will be observed .... [It] gives
meaning to or supplements or qualifies [an] agreement." Id. § 222(1), (3) (emphasis added).
161. Id. § 41 cmt. b (emphasis added).
162. Id. § 222 cmt. b.
163. 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 493 (1842).
164. Id. at 514-15; see also Dale Beck Furnish, Custom as a Source of Law, 30 AM. J. CoMP.
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The relationship between contract law and custom is reciprocal in nature.
Custom and usage affects, and is affected by, the law. As previously described,
the reasonable person acts as a receptacle for customary practice. The formal
rules of contract are affected by the staying power of custom and trade usage.
Longevity is a key factor in determining whether a certain custom or usage is
to reach maturity. When it has reached maturity, it will be utilized in the
fabrication of the reasonable person. Aristotle recognized the influence that
formal law has upon customary law. "[The] function of the law is to lay down
sound and balanced principles of character-formation... to accustom various
kinds of people, each in different ways, to refrain from greed .... ."6
Justice Holmes saw law creation as a gradual translation of the morality
of the community. "[W]hile the law does still and always, in a certain sense,
measure legal liability by moral standards, it nevertheless, by the very necessity
of its nature, is continually transmuting those moral standards into external or
objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the party concerned is wholly
eliminated.""I The morality of the community can be seen in its customs,
usage, and practices. The reasonable person will likely exhibit the same
morality. In this sense the reasonable person can be seen as a precursor to
changes in the formal rules of contract. The morality of the community as
reflected in the custom and usage of business are transmuted into the reason-
able person. Eventually, the transmutation gains general acceptance and is
formally accepted into the common law.
3. Llewellyn 's Double-Barreled Objectivity
The eyes of the reasonable person can be said to possess two lenses. Karl
Llewellyn speaks of these two perspectives as "double-barreled objectivi-
ty." 67 First, the reasonable person views a transaction from an interpretive
background. This interpretive background is the mix of custom, usage, and
practice that the two parties bring to the contract. 6 ' "The background of
trade practice gives a first indication; the line of authority rejecting unrea-
sonable practice offers the needed corrective."'69 The needed corrective
L. 31 (1982) (noting how custom and usage serve as a basis for modem law).
165. VON LEYDEN, supra note 54, at 82. A modem day example of this phenomena is the
doctrine ofunconscionability. The doctrine ofunconscionability has been formally adopted by the
Restatement and the Uniform Commercial Code. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 208; U.C.C.
§ 2-302 (1989) (unconscionable contract or clause). A proactive court may disregard a recognized
practice or usage as being unconscionable.
166. HOLMES, supra note 17, at 33.
167. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON (1960).
168. The parties are held to intend those practices, usages, and meanings of their custom or
trade that are regularly used. Custom and usage may act to "supplement or qualify" an agreement.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 220 cmt. a. Furthermore, "if the law merely supplies a term in
the absence of contrary agreement, usage can have the same effect as contrary agreement." Id. §
221 cmt. c.
169. LLE\VELLYN, supra note 167, at 367 (quoting Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv.
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involves the interpretation of the words of a contract through the lens of
reasonableness as embodied in custom and practice. The second lens of the
reasonable person is the determination of whether the parties attached a variant
meaning than one that would be implied by custom, usage, or practice. The
words of a contract are to be interpreted "first in the light of trade usage,
second in the light of the common meaning [attached by] the hearer and the
course of dealing of the parties."'7
The importance and complexity of trade usage and commercial practice led
Llewellyn to believe that the reasonable person as applied by a judge or jury
was ill-equipped to make such determinations of fact. "'[F]ew judges have the
specialized skill in such matters ... and juries are notoriously out of touch
with such matters."" 7' The reasonable person does not possess the highly
technical and specialized knowledge needed to determine what was considered
a reasonable practice or usage in a given trade or profession. Llewellyn
believed that such decisions should be abdicated to a merchant tribunal or to
expert arbitrators. His idea for a merchant tribunal was never adopted despite
his strong advocacy. The reasonable person remains the final arbiter of
commercial reasonableness.
The use of custom, usage, and practice as barometers of commercial
reasonableness illustrates that the fabrication of the reasonable person is both
a descriptive and a normative undertaking. The barometer of custom and usage
provides insight into the is of what the parties intended. It also provides a
measurement for what the community believes the contractual terms should
mean. "Those who make law try not to stray too far from the community's
moral sense" of reasonableness. Kent Greenawalt asserts that there is a
direct relationship "between the interpreter [the reasonable person] and what is
being interpreted and between the interpreter and the community in which he
is situated."'73 This analysis has suggested that the reasonable person serves
a number of roles or functions. These different roles are suggested by the
"should have known-reason to know" duality, by Llewellyn's "double-barreled
L. REv. 700, 702-03 (reviewing 0. PRAUSNriTZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937))).
170. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J 704,
722-23 n.45 (1931). In practice this priority of interpretation is reversed. The Uniform
Commercial Code states that "course of performance shall control both course of dealing and
usage of trade." U.C.C. § 2-208(2) (1989); see also U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1989) ("course of dealing
controls usage of trade").
171. Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: KarlLlewellyn and the Merchant Rules,
100 HARV. L. REv. 465, 513 (1987) (quoting Revised Uniform Sales Act 1941 (Report and
Second Draft), Introductory cmt. to §§ 59-59-D).
172. GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 166. Reasonableness can be seen as a product of a society's
sense of morality. Greenawalt reviews the relationship between law and cultural morality. Id. at
165-70.
173. Id. at 77.
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objectivity," and the descriptive-normative sides of the reasonable person's
personality.
4. The Language of the Reasonable Person
The reasonable person's task is to discern the contracting parties' intent.
The tools of this undertaking are the words and conduct of the parties. "The
intention of the act of promising is the world represented by the terms of the
promise, interpreted in accordance with the conventions of the relevant
language community .... ,174 Words are initially taken at their common
meanings "unless a special meaning is attributed... by trade custom or local
usage."17  Whether of common or technical meaning, the language of the
reasonable person is both elucidating and limiting in its effect. The language
of the reasonable person is the language of contract. It is used to understand
and describe the events of contract. In this regard it is essentially descriptive
in its import. The clarity of this descriptive enterprise is in constant need of
sharpening. James Boyd White explained the descriptive nature and short-
comings of language as follows: "The description of an event can go on forever
and still be incomplete. What is said is only part of what happens."'76 Ambi-
guity in contract occurs when the parties fail to speak or write in the language
of the reasonable person.
An "ambiguous" word or phrase is one capable of more than one meaning
when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has exam-
ined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of
the customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in
the particular trade or business.
177
Justice Holmes in his Theory of Legal Interpretation defined the language
of contract as that of the ordinary reasonable person.
174. Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, The World of a Contract, 75 IowA L. REv. 861,
864 (1990) (emphasis added).
175. HARvEY McGREGOR, CONTRACT CODE § 111, at 47 (1993) (model code prepared on
behalf of the English Law Commission).
176. JAMEs BoYD WHrrE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 3 (abr. ed. 1985). John Dewey explained
the clarifying objective of language: "Speech forms are our great carriers... by which meanings
are transported from experiences that no longer concern us to those that are as yet dark and
dubious." DEWEY, supra note 110, at 175.
177. Lipschutz v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 373 F. Supp. 375, 388 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (quoting
Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). The
importance of context in giving meaning to words was recognized by Aristotle. "Just as each
meaning of the word can live and survive in its own context, separately from the rest [of its
meanings], none is more relevant or 'essential' than any of the others." VON LEYDEN, supra note
54, at 108.
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[T]he normal speaker of English is merely a special variety, a literary form,
so to speak, of our old friend the prudent man. He is external to the
particular writer, and a reference to him as the criterion is simply another
instance of the externality of the law.
For each party to a contract has notice that the other will under-
stand his words according to the usage of the normal speaker of Eng-
lish ....178
The ordinary and technical meanings of words provide the vocabulary for the
reasonable person.179 They are the means of interpretation by which a court
may imply contractual intent and meaning to a transaction. 80 The interpreta-
tion of a contract by the reasonable person is thus "bounded by the words-in--
language in which they are made, and the social conventions those words
invoke." '' The language of the reasonable person is a sort of social litera-
ture, a way of talking about people and their relationships.'82 To the extent
that parties are able to rein in or limit the meaning of their words, the closer
the convergence of the actual intended meaning of the parties and the
interpretive meaning implied by the reasonable person will be.
C. From Who's Perspective Does the Reasonable Person View the Contractu-
al Landscape?
From what viewpoint does the reasonable person analyze an issue of
contract? Is it from the perspective of the promisor, the promisee, or neither?
The common law has generally framed its objective theory from the perspective
of the promisee. Pollock's 1902 treatise defines the test of contractual liability
178. Holmes, supranote 77, at 418-19; see also L. SchulerA.G. v. WickanMach. Tool Sales
Ltd., [1974] App. Cas. 235, 240 (1973) (appeal taken from Eng.) ('If an established meaning is
given to a word, the courts should adhere to it, for it is presumed that that is the meaning that the
parties have given to it.").
179. At times there may be both a common and a technical meaning that may be attributed to
a word. The common meaning will generally be invoked unless it is clear that the parties intended
to invoke the technical meaning of the word. "[I]t is incumbent upon the parties to make it
abundantly plain that the parties intended it to have that technical legal meaning, or otherwise the
court will give the word its popular meaning." Wickman Tools, [1974] App. Cas. at 243.
180. See, e.g., Peter Meijes Tiersma, Comment, The Language ofOfferandAcceptance: Speech
Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 CAt. L. REv. 189, 206 (1986) ("The circumstances and
context of the utterance assume great importance in deciphering the meaning of such speech
acts.").
181. Wickinan Tools, [1974] App. Cas. at 272; see also The Mihalis Angelos, [1971] 1 Q.B.
164 (C.A. 1971), cited in Wickman Tools [1974] App. Cas. at 240 (stating that courts adhere to
a word's established meaning because it is presumed the parties have also given the word the same
meaning).
182. See WNrrF, supra note 176, at 109.
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as "what expectation the promisor's words ... would have created in the mind
of a reasonable man in the promisee's place."' After reviewing the reason-
able person from the promisee's perspective, we will look at the alternatives--
promisor objectivity and third-party objectivity.
1. The Reasonable Person as Promisee
Often times the key issue in granting a contractual remedy is whether the
promisee reasonably relied upon the conduct or promise of the other party.
Was the reliance consistent with an objectively reasonable person's reliance?
The promisee perspective dominates most of the objective theory of contract.
The Restatement places strong emphasis upon the promisee's reliance,
expectation, and interpretation.'84 The Restatement's rejection of the subjec-
tive approach fundamentally shifted the perspective from the promisor to the
promisee.' The growth in the popularity of promissory estoppel supports the
importance of promisee objectivity in contractual interpretation. Section Ninety
of the Restatement is generally viewed as a vehicle to protect the expectation
and reliance interests of the promisee. It focuses the courts' attention upon the
reasonableness of the promisee's reliance. 6 "Measuring intent from the
point of view of the reasonable hearer ... favors the reliance interest of the
hearer over the speaker's interest in being bound only when the parties truly
have reached agreement." '87 It is only in the case of ambiguity and mistake
that "the speaker can make a legitimate argument that his subjective illoc-
utionary [sic] intent should prevail over his objective intent as perceived by a
reasonable person in the position of the hearer."'
88
2. The Reasonable Person as Promisor
183. FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 245 (7th ed. 1902), quoted in J.P.
Vorster, Comment, A Comment on the Meaning of Objectivity in Contract, 103 L.Q. REv. 274,
277 n.24 (1987) (emphasis added).
184. "[TMhe expectation and understanding of the [promisee] must also be taken into account."
RESTATEMENT, supranote 37, § 200 cmt. b. See generally Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation
and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 833 (1964) (discussing an overview of
contract interpretation).
185. Professor Gardner analyzed the promisor-promisee perspectives within his concept of
actual promise and apparent promise. See Gardner, supra note 28, at 4-8.
186. It can be argued that the vast amount of literature on reliance theory is generally premised
upon the promisee perspective. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text. But see Edward
Yorio & Steve Thel, The PromissoryBasis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991) (arguing that
courts use Section 90 to hold people to their promises rather than to compensate promisees for
their losses in reliance).
187. Tiersma, supra note 180, at 229.
188. Id. at 229-30.
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Despite the tortification of contract as championed by Professor Gil-
more, 1 9 numerous commentators still hold firm to the promissory basis of
contract."l The reasonable person is directed under this school to determine
liability and remedial issues based upon the expectations of the promisor. The
litmus test becomes not the fact of actual reliance, but the foreseeability of the
promisee's reliance from the perspective of the promisor. The proceedings to
the Restatement (First) of Contracts illuminate the promissory perspective. "We
have confined [Section Ninety] to the case where a reasonable person would
say that the promisor expected the man to do just what he did or that he ought
to have expected it."''"
Professor Vorster argues that to pigeonhole the reasonable person into the
role of promisor or promisee is counter-productive. Blame can equally be
placed at the foot of either the promisor or the promisee.
It may be argued that as a promisor knows what he wants to promise, he
should be under a duty to ensure that his intention is correctly understood
and that the promise should accordingly be viewed from the perspective of
a reasonable promisee. However, it may be argued with equal force that a
promisee knows what he wants from the promisor and that the promisee is
therefore bound to make sure the promisor understands what he wants from
him.
192
The reasonable person is a product of the creative efforts of the promisor and
promisee19'3 As such, neither perspective alone can adequately serve the
interpretive mandate of the reasonable person.
3. The Reasonable Person as a Third-Party
189. GILMORE, supra note 10.
190. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 21 (examining various principles of contract including
promise).
191. Yorio & Thel, supra note 186, at 126 (emphasis added) (quoting Proceedings at Fourth
Annual Meeting, 4 A.L.I. PROC. 93 (1926)). Professor Charles Fried has more recently
championed the promisor perspective for Section 90 liability.
There is a category of cases that has become famous in the law under the rubric
of promissory estoppel or detrimental reliance. In these cases there has indeed
generally been a promise, but the basis for legal redress is said to be the [promisee's]
detrimental reliance on the promise.... mhese cases should be seen for what they
are: a belated attempt to plug a gap in the general regime of enforcement of
promises ....
FRIED, supra note 21, at 25 (footnote).
192. Vorster, supra note 183, at 283 n.51 (emphasis added).
193. A contract "is the product of ajoint creative effort." Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing,
19 AM. U. L. REv. 131, 138 (1970).
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An alternative to the reasonable person being party-based is the reasonable
person as being detached or community-based. Instead of focusing upon the
intent of the parties, the reasonable person evaluates the reasonableness or
fairness of the exchange. 94 This view of the contracting process from the
view of a third party has a number of formulations. One will be referred to as
detached and a second as the communal reasonable person. The former focuses
upon the issues of interpretation from the perspective of a neutral third-party
observer or witness to the "operative acts" of the contract. 95 The detached
reasonable person is a fictional witness informed with all available information
and exposed to the totality of the circumstances.'96 It is from this fully
informed detached eyewitness that the intentions of the parties are discerned
and interpreted.
The notion of the communal reasonable person acknowledges that this
third-party observer may not be unbiased. The reasonable person's detachment
is clouded by a communal mind-set preconditioned to view the acts and
circumstances of the contract from the vantage of community and commercial
standards.' 97 The reasonable person's assessment of the parties' intentions is
likely to be impacted by certain contractual externalities. These externalities
include the courts' personal'98 and the community's notions of justice,
fairness, and unconscionability. The result is an interpretation which may not
only be rooted in the intention of the parties but also rooted in the reasonable
person's search for a fair and reasonable interpretation.
The communal reasonable person can be seen at work in the 1834 case of
Britton v. Turner. '" The case involved a contract for labor for a period of
one year. The contract clearly expressed that payment was due only upon the
completion of one year of labor. After nine months of labor, the worker left his
employment without the consent of the employer. The issue is whether the
employer under contract law owes pro rata compensation for the time served.
A detached reasonable person would likely answer in the negative. The contract
and the manifestations of the parties clearly expressed that compensation would
only be due upon the completion of the one year period of service. Instead, the
court applied the communal version of the reasonable person. "We have abun-
194. For a more complete examination of the notion of exchange fairness, see generally
ATIYAH, supra note 83 (discussing contract law and ideas of fairness in exchange) and Atiyah,
supra note 22 (examining the classic contract model).
195. For reference to the "operative acts" of contracts see RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § I
cmt. d.
196. See supranotes 112-38 and accompanying text (discussing the parties and the totality of
the circumstances).
197. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text (discussing custom and trade usage).
198. See infra notes 233-40, 255-68 and accompanying text (discussing subjectivity of judg-
ment).
199. 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
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dant reason to believe, that the general understanding of the community is, that
the hired laborer shall be entitled to compensation for the services actually per-
formed... and such contracts must be presumedto be made with reference to
that understanding.""2 ' The communal understanding of reasonableness is
used to overcome the intentions of the parties and that of detached objectivity.
Lord Denning sees the reasonable person not as the detached "officious
by-stander,"2 '' but as a proactive tool to be used by the courts to ensure
reasonableness in transactions. The reasonable person is to be used as an
interpretive device to filter even clear contractual language. Denning believes
that it should be exceedingly difficult for contract language to preempt a
reasonable person's interpretation. Are the words of the contract "to become
tyrannical masters" or should they be qualified in order to bring them within
the "true scope of the contract" as determined by the reasonable person? 2
For Denning the reasonable person is not so much concerned with contractual
intent as she is concerned with contractual justice. The reasonable person is "no
more than the anthropomorphic conception of justice."'2 3
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
Once constructed, the reasonable person is used as an interpretive tool in
determining the meaning to be given to the contracting parties' manifestations.
The reasonable person must decide if the parties had an intent to create a
contract and to give meaning to that intent. The reasonable person is used to
imply a general intent to contract and specific intent as to the terms of the con-
tract. The objective theory of contract mandates that it is the task of the court
to objectively construct and apply the reasonable person standard. However, the
subjective leanings of a judge also play a role in the fabrication of the
reasonable person. The subjectivity of judgment plays a role in the application
of the reasonable person and in the interpretation of manifestations of intent.
A. The Manipulation of the Reasonable Person
Professor Ian Macneil asserts that subjectivity plays a large role in the
fabrication and implementation of the reasonable person. The subjectification
of the reasonable person can be seen in a number of scenarios. First, the
manifestation of intent is manipulated to conform not to what the reasonable
200. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
201. DENNING, supra note 3, at 32-53.
202. Id. at 42. "Even if the contract is absolute in its terms, nevertheless if it is not absolute
in intent, it will not be held absolute in effect." Id.
203. Id at 38 (quoting Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council, [1956] App.
Cas. 696, 728 (1956) (appeal taken from Eng.)).
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person would interpret it as, but to conform to the court's notion of the parties
actual subjective intent. This manipulation represents an effort by the court "to
effectuate what it thinks was the real or subjective intention of both of the
parties." ''  A related manipulation of the reasonable person is the conforming
of manifestations to the type of contract involved or to its essential nature.
"[T]he court manipulates manifested intention in order to achieve what it thinks
were the basic purposes of the parties in carrying on the contractual relation-
ship."2 5 There is an anthropomorphizing of the contractual document. It is
viewed as a person or thing from which an interpretation may be drawn
regarding an ambiguity, a missing term, or the underlying intent of the
parties.206 The notions of the essence of contract or contract as thing are
convenient theoretical devices for conforming judicial constructionism with the
traditional reasonable person analysis. The focus of the reasonable person is not
on the direct, objective interpretation of the parties' manifestations. The focus
is the court's subjective view of what it believes the parties intended, or
alternatively, an attempt to conform the manifestation to the court's belief
regarding the purpose of the contract.
The common law doctrine of mistake is an area in which external
manifestations are not formalistically applied. A purely objective application
of the reasonable person standard would hold a party liable for the reasonable
interpretation of the party's outward manifestations." 7 The common law
doctrine of mistake gives relief even though the parties manifested intentions
indicate the formation of a contract.208 Relief through reformation or rescis-
204. IAN R. MAcNEIL, CONTRACTS 279 (1971).
205. Id. (emphasis added). The notion of interpreting a contract through its essence was
discussed earlier in this article and has a long history. In philosophy there is a "tradition going
back to ancient Greece that to explain a phenomenon is to provide its essential nature." Warren
Schmaus, Explanation and Essence in the Rules of the Sociological Method and the Division of
Labor in Society, 38 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 57 (1995).
206. Professor Atiyah connects contractas thingwith the classical contract model, which views
"contract [as] a thing, which has some kind of objective existence prior to any performance or any
act of the parties." Atiyah, supra note 22, at 197; see also Leff, supra note 193 (proposing a new
way of thinking about consumer-transaction contracts); cf Eric G. Andersen, A New Look at
Material Breach in the Law of Contracts, 21 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1073 (1988) (arguing that the
essence of a contract is an inadequate technique for determining if a breach is material). Theorist
Lon Fuller also believed that a contract had an essential nature that could be used in the
interpretive enterprise. He referred to this nature as the "internal rationality" of contract. See
Robert S. Summers, Lon L. Fuller's Jurisprudence and the Possibility It Was Much Influenced
by G. W.F. Hegel, CORNELL L.F., June 1983, at 9. Fuller believed "contractual processes ... have
a distinctive inner order of their own-an integrity-to be discovered and respected by those who
have responsibility for their functioning." Id. at 12.
207. The formalistic application of rules and of legal formalities characterized the legal system
of ancient Rome. "In the formalistic stage ... a legal system which has come to enforce contracts
will enforce them as made, and will not give relief for mistakes." Hoffmnan F. Fuller, Mistake and
Error in the Law of Contracts, 33 EMoRY L.J. 41, 41 (1984).
208. For a look at the notion of error in the civil law, see generally David P. Doughty,
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sion allows the subjectivity of fairness to hold sway over pure objectivity.
Professor Hoffman Fuller describes the doctrine of mistake as a "meaningless
shelter [in which] a court is free to do as it chooses, set loose to sail on an
ocean of subjectivity."2 9
1. The Reasonable Person and the Consumer Form Contract
The role of the reasonable person has expanded with the advent of form
contracts." ° The standardization of contracts has removed the narrow focus
of the reasonable person from the four comers of the contract.2 ' The ratio-
nalization of this narrower focus was premised upon the sanctity of the written
contract and the duty of the contracting parties to read any instrument upon
which they affix their signatures. This traditional focus holds that the act of
signing a standard form is evidence that the signer intended to accept all of its
terms. The full totality of the circumstances analysis is shunted. The reasonable
person determines contractual consent based solely upon a four comers reading
of the contract.
This approach became increasingly untenable when it became apparent that
in reality there was no such actual consent. A rational application of the
reasonable person standard would recognize the flaw in this notion of consent.
The fact of the matter was that at least one of the parties did not read or
understand the fine print of the preprinted form. There is no true manifestation
of intent because there has been no conscious agreement to accept the unread
terms. This unawareness of the forms' content is akin to the doctrine of
mistake where one party is unaware of a certain fact. It became increasingly
difficult for the reasonable person to conclude that the parties had consented
to all the terms in the form. The role of the reasonable person was thus
Comment, ErrorRevisited: The Louisiana Revision of Error as a Vice of Consent in Contracting,
62 TuL. L. REV. 717 (1988) (comparing the 1870 Civil Code to the revised code of 1984 that
increased flexibility in solving problems of mistake in contracting).
209. Fuller, supra note 207, at 91.
210. See, e.g., Andrew Burgess, ConsumerAdhesion Contracts and Unfair Terms: A Critique
of CurrentTheoryanda Suggestion, 15 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 255 (1986) (suggesting that adhesion
contracts are fair as they serve the public interest); Michael 1. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer
Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583 (1990)
(discussing the elimination of assent when determining conscionability of contract terms)
[hereinafter Meyerson, Efficient Consumer]; Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract
Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1263 (1993)
(proposing the application of the objective theory of contracts to solve the problem of form
contracts) [hereinafter Meyerson, Reunification]; W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of
Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 21
(1984) (discussing how parties' reasonable expectations give meaning to contracts); Speidel,
Unconscionability, supra note 83, at 359 (discussing the elimination of assent when determining
unconscionability of contract terms).
211. For a look at the first major work on the standardization of contracts, see Nathan Isaacs,
The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917).
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expanded to determine what reasonable terms would be included and what
unreasonable terms would be jettisoned from the contract. In order to
accomplish this task the reasonable person was placed in the shoes of the
recipient of the form, generally the ordinary consumer, to determine the
person's reasonable expectations regarding the intent of the terms to be found
in the form.21 2 "[C]ourts must examine the circumstances surrounding the
transaction to determine the consumer's objective understanding."2 3 The
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer are used to supplement the
actual writing in the courts enforcement decisions. Professor Meyerson asserts
that this reasonable expectation analysis can also be performed from the
perspective of the form-giver. "[A] consumer's assent to a contract should be
determined by how a reasonable person in the other party's position would
ascertain the consumer's intent as manifested through words and deeds." '214
Whether from the perspective of the consumer or the form-giver, the final
guide to enforcement is not the written form but what the signing party knew
and what a reasonable consumer would have known." 5
Professor Llewellyn devised a solution to the dilemma of determining the
reasonable intention of the parties in the area of form contracts. He bifurcated
form contracts: the dickered deal and the supplementary boilerplate deal.2"6
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize
that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in
fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the
broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more. That one thing more
is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or
indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or
eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.217
212. The notion of reasonable expectations can be seen throughout the law of contracts. See,
e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 666 (1963) (suggesting that the UCC's obligation
of good faith be extended by analogy to other types of contracts); Calvin R. House, Good Faith
Rejection and Specific Performance in Publishing Contracts: Safeguarding the Author's
Reasonable Expectations, 51 BROOK. L. REv. 95 (1984) (proposing that damages be awarded to
authors whose reasonable expectation of publication are justified. " '.-N-erson, Efficient Consumer,
supra note 210, at 608-23 (discussing the doctrine of reasunable expectations).
213. Meyerson, Reunification, supra note 210, at 1300.
214. Id. at 1325-26 (emphasis added).
215. "[C]ourts should examine both what the consumer actually knew and what knowledge is
properly attributable to the consumer."Id. at 1326 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 155-59
and accompanying text (discussing the reason to know-should know duality of the reasonable
person).
216. LLEWVLLYN, supra note 167, at 371.
217. Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
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The reasonable person is given two tasks in Llewellyn's dichotomy: (1) to
interpret the meaning of the terms expressly negotiated by the parties," 8 and
(2) to determine what non-dickered terms are to be reconstructed or expelled
due to unreasonableness or what reasonable terms are to be implied to fill in
gaps.
The notion of blanket assent was reanalyzed by Professor Fried. He asks
whether it is the task of the courts to construct "a kind of nonconsensual
penumbra around the consensual core.""1 9 The reasonable person can perform
this task by looking to the type or essence of the contract. For purposes of
determining reasonableness, the reasonable person looks to the terms generally
found in such contracts. The test becomes "whether the consumer, as a
reasonable man, should have been aware of the material risk allocated to
him" ' ° or whether the terms of the form contract were 'fundamentally
different in its purport from what [a reasonable person would have] believed
to be the case."'" The reasonable person is called on to conform the boiler-
plate terms to the spirit of the contract as represented by the dickered terms and
the type of transaction being undertaken. A second-order conformity is often
performed as well. This is the conformity best engineered by the communal
reasonable person. It is based upon the assumption that the parties blanket
assent was made with the implied understanding that the other party's
boilerplate did not contain any unreasonable or unfair terms.' This indicates
a transformation of the reasonable person from being a creation of objective
fact to being a creation of values.' The focus is not on what was consid-
ered to be reasonable at the time of formation as perceived by the contracting
parties. Instead, the focus has shifted forward to what the reasonable person
considers to be reasonable from the perspective of the court. Professor Horwitz
218. The importance of interpreting terms consistently with other terms of the contract was
recently noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit when it decided an
issue "[m]indful of the maxim that an agreement must be interpreted as a whole and all parts
harmonized as far as possible so that no part is rendered surplusage." Badger Pharmacal, Inc. v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 1 F.3d 621, 630 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Peiffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 187
N.W.2d 182, 185 (Wis. 1971) ("Mhe agreement must be considered as a whole and all parts
harmonized as far as possible."); Marion v. Orson's Camera Ctrs., Inc., 138 N.W.2d 733, 735
(Wis. 1966) ("It is not the office of a judicial tribunal to find a meaning which is contrary to the
language used in an agreement.").
219. FRIED, supra note 21, at 72.
220. Spiedel, Unconscionability, supra note 83, at 363.
221. PHILIP S. JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 316 (12th ed. 1989).
222. "[T]he boiler-plate is assented to en bloc.., on the implicit assumption.., that.., its
terms are neither in the particular nor in the net manifestly unreasonable and unfair." LLEWELLYN,
supra note 167, at 371.
223. See, e.g., Stephen Hedley, Keeping Contract In Its Place-Balfour v. Balfour and the
EnforceabilitjoflnformalAgreements, 5 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 391,397-99 (1985) (discussing
three main theories which courts apply in determining the intent of the parties).
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summarized this conversion of the reasonable person: "Objectivism was the
legal expression of this quest for uniformity. It shifted legal inquiry away from
a focus on actual intent or will toward a concern with reasonable, average, or
customary practices." 4
2. The Relational Reasonable Person
Classical contract's paradigm is the discrete, one-shot transactional
exchange. The reasonable person is propelled back into time to the moment of
the formation of the contract. The reasonable person analyzes the language of
the contract, the characteristics of the parties, and the surrounding circumstanc-
es at the time of the formation in order to determine contractual intent and the
meaning of the contract.' Modem contracts have become increasingly
complex multi-event happenings incapable of being analyzed by a static
reasonable person whose fixation is upon the mystical moment of formation.
The modem contractual relationship is often a long-term evolutionary
phenomenon. The evolving and open-ended nature of many modem day
contracts led one commentator to proclaim that "[t]he complexity of most
modem agreements insures that such will rarely be fully completed." 6 In
this framework the normal application of the reasonable person is ill-equipped.
The search for specific intent regarding a contractual term or event may be
difficult to uncover using a traditional reasonable person analysis. "When rights
and obligations cannot be traced to an express contract, but instead relate back
to an informal and often long-term relationship ... it is difficult to find real
consent to the duties imposed by courts .... "
Professor MacNeil poses a response to this divide between transactional
and relational contracts: "[One] response is to develop an overall structure of
contract law of greater general applicability than now exists and to merge both
the details and the structure of transactional contract law into that overall con-
tract structure."'228 The inherent flexibility of the reasonable person makes it
open to modification in order to account for reasonableness in the context of
a long-term relational contract. The arsenal of facts used to fabricate the
224. Hopwrrz, supra note 19, at 48.
225. The courts interpretive analysis is likely to center upon "the practices of actors and on their
usages, customs, and interpretations that mediate between [their] actual patterns of conduct and
the formal juridical instruments that are deemed to govern them." Gidon Gottlieb, Relationism:
Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 567, 568 (1983).
226. Thomas P. Egan, Equitable Doctrines Operating Against the Express Provisions of
Written Contract (Or When Black and White Equals Gray), 5 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 261, 312 (1993).
227. Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 139, 142.
228. Ian R. Macneil, Commentary, Restatement (Second) of ContractsandPresentation, 60 VA.
L. REV. 589, 597 (1974).
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reasonable person will need to be expanded to include the elements often found
in long-term relationships-trust, cooperation, and informality.
In the relational context, the reasonable person must work within an
expanded totality of the circumstances analysis. The application of the
reasonable person standard to a specific contractual act may yield a different
conclusion than one which views that specific act as only a single event within
a more expansive relationship. Within such an expanded relational framework,
it may be more likely for the reasonable person to find a binding obligation.
This broadened perspective will make the reasonable person more adaptable
and useful in the interpretation and enforcement of relational contracts. The key
additional circumstance of this broadened analysis is the nature of the
relationship itself. The reasonable person must decide whether the "parties
willed a certain normative relationship." '229 If so willed, then the contractual
issue or term for which the reasonable person has been called upon to address
should be interpreted in a way conducive to that normative relationship.
B. Reliance Theory and the Reasonable Person
In a more traditional role, the reasonable person's primary task is to
determine whether a party intended to enter into a binding legal obligation.
Once such contractual intent is found, the reasonable person must determine the
meaning of what the party intended. The reasonable person reviews the
outward manifestations in the search for contractual intent and contractual
meaning. The reasonable person is not concerned with what the promisor
actually intended, but is only concerned with intention as manifested in the
promisor's words and conduct. Professor Eisenberg describes the objective
perspective of the reasonable person.
[Objectivity] is congruent with moral norms because a person who intends
something other than the reasonable meaning of his words has used
language carelessly. It is congruent with policy because the security of
transactions (and therefore the ability to plan reliably) would be undermined
if a person could escape contractual liability by convincing a fact finder that
he had subjectively attached some special, unreasonable meaning to his
expressions. It is consistent with the body of the law because the law often
measures conduct by a reasonable-person standard230
There is a second area of contractual liability in which the reasonable
person plays a pivotal role. It is the area where liability is affixed not upon the
basis of contractual intent but on the basis of reliance by the promisee. The
229. GORDLEY, supra note 53, at 241.
230. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 6 (1988) (emphasis
added).
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reasonable person is not utilized to determine if a promisor intended to be
bound, but to determine whether a promisee reasonably relied upon the prom-
ise. This is the realm of reliance theory. The promissory basis of contract is
generally premised upon the notion of contractual intent. Reliance-based
liability is not concerned with a party's intent but whether the party's
manifestations have caused harm. Professor Atiyah describes this vein of
contractual liability as based upon "something else."'" That something else
is the element of reasonable reliance. What is considered to be reliance? It is
what the reasonable person standing in the shoes of the promisee believes to
be grounds for reliance.
The 1871 case of Smith v. Hughes 2 illustrates the relationship between
promise and reliance. Two parties from different trades had contracted for the
sale of a specific quantity of oats. The purchaser acted upon the belief that he
was purchasing seasoned oats when in reality the oats were of a newer harvest.
Nonetheless, the court decided the contract was enforceable under the
reasonable person standard. Even though the parties were not in agreement as
to the age of the oats, they were in agreement regarding the specific batch of
oats in question. If the seller knew of the purchaser's illusion regarding the age
of the oats, then he could have been held accountable based upon the reliance
theory. Since this was not the case, the purchaser was held to be liable because
"whatever a man's real intention may be, [if] he so conducts himself that a
reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by
the other party,.. . the man thus conducting himself would be equally
bound., , 3
V. THE SUBJECTIVITY OF JUDGMENT
The reasonable person is the personification of the objective theory of
contracts. The jural rudiments of the reasonable person can be traced to the
disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and theology. The goals of the
reasonable person are often premised in the language of freedom of contract.
A law based upon objective interpretation of external manifestations is likely
to promote predictability, certainty, generality, and, ultimately, fairness in the
rule of law. Despite the elaborate development of the reasonable person
standard, the fact remains that the mantle of objectivity must be viewed
231. Atiyah, supra note 22, at 203. It should be made clear that their is often a very close
relationship between intent and reliance in a given factual situation. The clearer the manifestation
of intent, the more likely it is a reflection of actual intent and the more reasonable will be the
reliance. "If the promisee's reliance is reasonable, it is likely also to be within the reasonable
contemplation of the promisor." Yorio & Thel, supra note 186, at 123. Thus, reliance can be seen
as the flipside of intent.
232. 6 L.R.-Q.B. 597 (Q.B. 1871).
233. Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
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through the subjective gaze of the judicial mind. In order to better understand
the interpretive value of the reasonable person standard we must look into that
mind. "[A] map reader who wishes to find out where he is located... tries to
discover something about himself, not something about the map . ,, 234
Cardozo's adage that the role of judge is one of creation underscores the
subjectiveness of the judicial decision-making process.
[W]ithin the limits [of precedent and custom] thus set, within the range
over which choice moves, the final principle of selection for judges ... is
one of fitness to an end .... We do not pick our rules of law full-blos-
somed from the trees. Every judge consulting his own experience must be
conscious of times when a free exercise of will ... determined the form
and tendency of a rule which at that moment took its origin in one creative
act.235
The fabrication of the reasonable person can be seen as one of these creative
acts. A judge sweeping the landscape of facts, custom, usage, and practice has
much to choose from in developing a concept of the reasonable person. This
landscape is viewed through the unique vantage of the individual judge."6
John Dewey explained that the process of thinking is influenced by a "number
of unseen and unconsidered causes-past experience, received dogmas, the
stirring of self-interest, the arousing of passion, sheer mental laziness... and
so on."
237
The subjectivity of judicial decision-making and the objectivity of the
reasonable person standard can be said to have a reciprocal relationship. The
reasonable person is the inevitable prisoner of the subjective judicial mind.
Nonetheless, the reasonable person acts as a constraining influence upon
judicial subjectivity. "The primary restraint on judges is the compelling need
to articulate a principled decision, one that resides in logic independent of the
result of the case at issue.""8 It can be said that judges are constrained by
institutional values. A judge's view of the purpose of courts, the law, the
process of adjudication, the importance of uniformity, and predictability are all
examples of institutional values. The use of the reasonable person standard can
234. GMON GoTFLiEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE 95 (1968).
235. CARDozO, supra note 4, at 103-04.
236. "[J'udges generally have a choice among competing principles and... their choices are
based on personal attitudes and values... ." HoRowrrz & WILLGiNG, supra note 66, at 27.
237. DEwEY, supra note 110, at 26.
238. Id. The importance of rationalization to judicial decision-making was explored by Joel
Levin. "[J]udicial decisions are reconstructions. Once the judge arrives at a decision, he employs
an analogue yielded by his judicial view and reconstructs his decision on a rational basis." Joel
Levin, The Concept of the Judicial Decision, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 208, 221 (1983). The
reasonable person can be seen as such an analogue.
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be seen as serving one of the more prevalent institutional values, that of loyalty
to "the orderly development of the law." 9 Judges feel compelled to justify
their decisions by reference to some external, objective analogue.24 The
reasonable person provides a well recognized arbiter that a judge may use to
stamp a decision with an aura of objectivity and rationality.24
A. Gardner, Holmes, and Llewellyn on Judicial Constraints
Professor Gardner categorized the judicial decision-making process into
three intellectual stages. The "scientific stage" places the reasonable person in
the role as discoverer of the is of contract. It is the "ascertainment of what the
parties did and thought."242 This is the use of the reasonable person in a de-
scriptive persona. The reasonable person in the normative persona is referred
to as the "ethical stage." This is the reasonable person acting as the advance
guard of a community's sense of fairness, or the ought of contract. It is the
determination of what ought to have been done and what ought now be
done.243 The "practical stage" of Gardner's analysis can be seen as a combi-
nation of the first two stages as configured around the individual judge's core
values. The practical stage is the rendering of a decision that represents the
"best practicable means of bringing about a just result."2"
The constraints of precedent, legal rules, institutional values, and legal and
community norms from which the reasonable person is born all act to limit the
discretion of the jurist. Justice Holmes in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen
poetically articulated the bounded nature of judicial discretion or subjectivity.
"I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can
do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular mo-
tions." '245 They are constrained by law's objective guideposts, like the
doctrine of stare decisis, and legal standards, like the reasonable person. Karl
Llewellyn believed that the meaningful constraints upon judicial discretion, or
leeways, were to be found in the more sublime reaches of the judicial mind.
The inner workings of the judicial mind are conditioned by a process of
socialization that results in one acting as a judge qua judge.246 Llewellyn
239. Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of
Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. Rlv. 200, 215 (1984).
240. Judges feel a natural compulsion to give an account for all arguably relevant rules,
principles, and policies that bear upon the cases before them. See Samuel I. Shuman, Justification
of Judicial Decisions, 59 CAL. L. Rlv. 715, 720-21 (1971).
241. For a discussion of rule application and judicial justification, see David Lyons,
Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 CAL. L. REv. 178 (1984).
242. Gardner, supra note 28, at 39.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
246. Stanley Fish developed the concept of the judicial system as a "community of
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believed that the members of the judicial community were indoctrinated with
an "operating technique." It was through this technique that the judicial mind
was influenced by a sense of judicial community and the notion of judicial
craft.247
Llewellyn structured cases along a spectrum ranging from those susceptible
to strict rule application to those requiring or allowing for a higher degree of
subjectivity. The reasonable person standard can be seen as an example of an
application of the former type of case. It is, however, also susceptible to a high
degree of subjectivity. The fact that the reasonable person is created on an ad
hoc basis allows for subjectivity in the fabrication and implementation of the
standard in order to justify a desired result. Llewellyn believed that judicial
decision-making generally revolved around a "judge's honest efforts to derive
a conclusion from a rule [or standard]."248 In the application of legal rules
and standards, however, judges are likely influenced by emotional factors249
and public policy. "[J]udges more or less consciously behave in a policy-orien-
ted fashion ... within the leeway bounded by rules and precedents." 5' It can
be argued that the reasonable person standard is itself a policy-oriented device.
The reasonable person generally reflects a communal vision of appropriateness.
Ronald Dworkin's theory of adjudication is essentially a theory of com-
munity.25' The judge is sensitive to the notion of community in fabricating
the reasonable person. "The prudential judge... is attentive to general
standards of reasonableness and the need for coherence .... ,", Philosopher
Pierre De Tourtoulan was more vehement in his belief in the relationship be-
tween community standards and the role of judge. "[T]he law ought to be at
the time of its creation the expression of the will of all, or, at least, of the
greatest number, and ... this ... ought to be instilled into the judge and the
interpretation." See Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and
Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 551 (1982). There is a normative framework in which a judge
assesses himself in relation to the judicial community. "By failing to adhere to basic norms that
define his role within the legal system, he has performed an act that is determinately, objectively
wrong under the law and he has violated his promise to fulfill the judge's role." .,ntEENAWALT,
supra note 6, at 89.
247. Paul Gewirtz, Editor's Introduction to KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN
AMERICA at ix, xbi (Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989). Llewellyn coined a number of phrases to
describe the subjective influences including the.notion ofjudicial intuition which he borrowed
from Roscoe Pound, the sociology of doctrine, and judicial sensitivity. See LLmvELLYN, supra
note 5, at 78, 89, & 79.
248. LLEWELLYN, supra note 5, at 10.
249. In some decisions "emotional factors [such as] ethical, political, sociopolitical, economic,
religious... are the deciding factor." Id.
250. Id.
251. See Ronald Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHiL. 624 (1963) (discussing judicial
discretion).
252. CORNELiuS F. MURPHY, JR., DESCENT INTO SuBjEcrvrrv 116 (1990).
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jurist.""u3 The reasonable person can be seen as a judicial attempt to cohere
the facts of a given case with community standards.
The reasonable person standard and its application is essentially fact-based.
The standard is premised upon two sets of facts, those stemming from the case
and those procured from community standards and practices. For Llewellyn this
fact-based approach is hardly a purely objective exercise. There is an indeter-
minacy of facts because the determination of the factual is experienc-
ed-based." Llewellyn's operating technique involves the application of
contractual rules through a categorization of facts. This categorization of facts
is an attempt to limit the scope of judicial subjectivity. Certain categories of
facts dictate a finding of legal consequences. The reasonable person can be
seen as a vehicle for categorizing facts that are legally significant. This
technique ameliorates, but does not eliminate, the subjectivity of factual
interpretation. It is sufficient to acknowledge that the judicial mind is
influenced by both the objectivity of the reasonable person and the subjectivity
of experience and values. William James saw this as a positive. In his
influential work Pragmatism, he saw the need in any system, legal or
otherwise, to possess both the influences of "loyalty to facts" and of the "old
confidence in human values.2 55
. The Subjectivity of Judgment
The appeal of the reasonable person is rooted in notions of objectivity and
impartiality. The reasonable person provides an aura that the judicial mind
'can rise above all considerations of personal conviction and private feeling'
in rendering a decision." 6 It is an illusion, however, to believe that a judge's
personal values and beliefs do not enter into the fabrication and application of
the reasonable person standard. The judge must construct the reasonable person
through a personal subjective belief of reasonableness. 7 Discretion is a
253. DE TOURTOULAN, supra note 65, at 192.
254. If one observes a new fact situation and is sensitive to its real-life meaning,
then there is a sudden and (so to speak) ex post facto change in the meaning
of one's prior life experience in that area .... The "intuition" in this process
lies in the judge's subconsciously using his prior experience and his
sensitivity to the meaning of new fact situations.... A judge's intuition
extends only as far as his experience and sensitivity.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 5, at 79.
255. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 13 (Bruce Kuklick ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1981) (1907).
256. ARTHuR T. VANDERBILT, JuDGEs AND JuRORs: THEIR FUNCTIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND
SELECTION 20 n.67 (1956) (citation omitted).
257. The judicial process ... is a retrospective or backward-looking process of
analysis calculated to interpret general rules in terms of particular sets of
facts. The important point is that in order to apply law it must be interpret-
ed .... Someone must be able to say what the general rule of law means
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necessary ingredient of the reasonable person standard because it needs to be
reinvented on a case by case basis. Discretion in the area of contract law
manifests itself in numerous ways. Like human fingerprints, no two legal fact
patterns are identical. Subjectivity enters the equation through the judicial
sentiment of wanting to do justice in a particular case. Often, a court avoids
injustice through innovative interpretations of "[h]istory or custom or social
utility."" 8 This creative interpretation directly impacts the fabrication of the
reasonable person. Through the arts of distinction and discovery a court can
avoid the onerous results of a particular fabrication. A modification of custom
or a creative recognition of a trade usage is used to cloak a just decision with
the halo of conformity to the reasonable person standard. If the modification
is subsequently used by other courts, then the initial act of creation is
surrounded with "the halo of conformity to precedent.
259
Justice Cardozo discussed the interplay between the role of subjectivity
and the application of external standards such as the reasonable person.
[The judge's role] is to bring about a just determination by means of the
subjective sense of justice inherent in the judge, guided by an effective
weighing of the interests of the parties in the light of the opinions generally
prevailing among the community [the objective sense] regarding transac-
tions like those in question.260
"He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition [subjective sense],
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system [objective sense], and subordi-
nated to 'the primordial necessity of order in the social life."''" The
reasonable person standard incorporates objective facts and subjective elements
when used to interpret contracts. The objective theory as represented by the
reasonable person standard becomes a misnomer when it disregards the reality
of the subjectivity ofjudgment. "Only if we are conscious of our experiencing,
understanding, judging, and deciding can we guarantee the objectivity of the
results."2 62 It is only in attempting to understand the role of the subjectivity
of judgment and its relationship to the fabrication of the reasonable person can
we hope to discover objective truth.
to a particular person in a particular set of circumstances.
THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF LAW, supra note 109, at 138. That person in the law of contracts
is the reasonable person as constructed by the individual judge.
258. CARnozo, supra note 4, at 43.
259. Id. at 45.
260. Id. at 74.
261. Id. at 141.
262. GRANFIELD, supra note 89, at 3. Granfield succinctly states that "objectivity always
depends on subjectivity." Id.
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1. Discretion as the Touchstone of Subjectivity
Contractual decision-making involves a dialectic with the reasonable
person and the subjectivity of judgment representing the objective-subjective
poles. The touchstone of the subjective pole is judicial discretion. It is the
interplay between judicial discretion or selectivity and the existing standards
and rules of law that directly impact upon the implementation of the reasonable
person standard. "We can make sense of the idea of judicial choice and
discretion only against a background of rules to which judges are subject." 63
Rule skeptics believe judges are free to ignore or interpret rules and standards
in order to justify a preconceived decision. To them, the reasonable person acts
as a facade to mask judicial discretion. The court constructs the reasonable
person with an eye towards rationalizing a predetermined result.
An alternative, and I believe a more plausible interfacing of the poles of
the dialectic, is that judicial discretion is constrained by standards such as the
reasonable person. The reasonable person standard acts as a check upon
unbridled judicial discretion.2" It requires the court to discuss the objectivity
of its analysis by way of its fabrication and implementation of the reasonable
person standard. The discretion inherent in the art of judicial interpretation is
constrained by the judicial reverence for the rules and standards of law. Profes-
sor Greenawalt discusses coherence theory as it relates to judicial discretion and
external standards. Under a theory of coherence a judge gives effect "as
objectively as he can to the values already implicit in the legal system."' 5
The judge's decisions must cohere with judicial benchmarks existing within
authoritative legal standards. The reasonable person is an example of such a
legal standard.2"
There are inevitably areas where the objectivity of legal standards will fail
to provide adequate guidance. It is in these areas that the subjectivity of judicial
discretion will play a pivotal role. "When authoritative standards yield no clear
263. Martin P. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century
America-Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441, 465 (1986); see also John
Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process ofDecision, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 833 (1931)
(discussing the philosophy of legal rules and their importance in judicial decisions).
264. Professor Kromnan discusses the free creativity element of judicial decision-making:
The idea that there is an irreducible element of free creativity, of interpretive freedom,
in the adjudicative process which is left over, so to speak, after one has taken account
of all the rules that might conceivably bear on the case at hand is today an idea so
familiar, so patently obvious, that it has lost all of its original power to shock or
disturb.
Anthony T. Kronman, The Problem of Judicial Discretion, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 481, 481 (1986).
265. Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Questfor the Fetters that
Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. Rnv. 359, 396 (1975). Greenawalt analyzes the works of Ronald
Dworkin and Rolf Sartorious on the subject of judicial discretion.
266. Others that come to mind include the legal standards of materiality, substantiality uncon-
scionability, and good faith.
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answers... and when more than one result will widely be regarded as a
satisfactory fulfillment of his judicial responsibilities ... [the judge] has
discretion to decide between them."267 Another area where judicial discretion
plays a crucial role is the determination of whether an issue is one of law or
one of fact. A court may maneuver around a previous fabrication of the reason-
able person by distinguishing a previous case or usage upon the facts.' An
issue of law is then transcended into an issue of fact. The reasonable person of
a similar case can be reconfigured to support a different result.
The reasonable person is an example of the use of community values and
customs in the fabrication of a legal standard. It is the task of the judge to
determine the existing values, customs, usage, and practices of a particular
community. How does a judge differentiate personal values from community
values? The objective aims of a judge in uncovering community values will
undoubtedly be tainted by the judge's personal value system. Often times this
infusion of personal values into the judicial decision-making process may not
be premeditated. "[W]e are often able to find reflections of our own views in
external ambiguous sources, ... [however] our capacity for self-deception
increases as the level of abstraction gets higher." '269 This projection of
personal values into the community value determination is likely to increase
when dealing with such abstract concepts as good faith, fair dealing, and
reasonableness.
2. The Reasonable Person as Synthesis
The reasonable person can be seen as a synthesis of legal and community
values. The individual judge constructs the reasonable person within the
constraints of the judicial community and of the extra-judicial community. The
notion that the reasonable person is a product of judicial decision-making has
been explored by a number of commentators. Ronald Dworkin speaks of law
as a collective enterprise in which judges act as novelists writing successive
chapters of a chain novel.270 From this perspective the fabrication of the
reasonable person is not undertaken on a purely ad hoc basis. Instead, earlier
fabrications are used as a starting point to which ajudge turns for guidance. At
most, a newer reasonable person is simply a modification of an earlier fabrica-
tion. Earlier fabrications of the reasonable person by fellow judges and lawyers
can be seen as constraints upon judicial discretion and subjectivity. Duncan
Kennedy refers to the notion of double objectivity as a conscious effort by
judges to conform their decisions within a range of acceptability as determined
267. Greenawalt, supra note 265, at 378.
268. See, e.g., Ashville Invs. Ltd. v. Elmer Contractors Ltd., [1989] Q.B. 488 (C.A. 1987)
(holding that a previous interpretation of an arbitration clause did not have precedential value).
269. Greenanwalt, supra note 265, at 397.
270. RONALD DwoRKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 159 (1985).
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by the general legal community. 2 ' A judge attempts to fabricate the reason-
able person to reflect a view of objectivity and as a fabrication that will be
acceptable within the legal community. Professor Kennedy felt that this process
of fabrication and application involved a social component.272 The yearning
for acceptance and credibility acts to keep the judge's subjectivity within
acceptable limits. Consequently, the reasonable person can be seen as a
synthesis drawn from the entire judicial community.
The reasonable person can also be seen as a Hegelian synthesis of the
external and the internal. 3 This synthesis acknowledges that behind the
objectification of reasonableness lies the subjectivity ofjudgment. The synthesis
is a realization that the generality of law as represented by the reasonable
person must be tempered with pragmatic application. Often the concerns of
pragmatism, justice, and subjectivity are found in the courts' dicta. These
concerns are then synthesized over time transforming the dicta into rule. The
subjective is converted into the objective. Arguably, the interpretation of facts
is the heart and soul of the reasonable person. Professor Frug asserts that "[t]he
interpretation of facts suffers from the ... intermixture of subjectivity and
objectivity."' 74 Since this intermixture or synthesis "is a human creation and
not a reflection of what the world 'is really like,""'27 the reasonable person
is similarly a legally concocted fiction.
Professor Bronaugh speaks of "subjective reasonableness"in analyzingthe
bargain theory of contracts.276 He openly asserts that the reasonable person
possesses a strong subjective element. His reasonable person is not the
communal or detached personification of pure objectivity. Instead, his
reasonable person has a party-specific perspective to which a party's subjective
beliefs play a role in the reasonableness inquiry. The subjective beliefs of the
parties are encapsulated within an objective boundary.277 "[T]o test the
reasonableness of someone's subjective belief is not to be indifferent to his
belief; it is that subjective state which is the very subject of an [objective]
evaluation.""27 Subjective reasonableness allows a defending party to state
271. Kennedy, supra note 104, at 521.
272. Id. at 561.
273. See generally GEORO W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL (Carl 1. Friedrich ed.,
1954); Summers, supra note 206, at 12 ("Hegel worked out a theory of logic that seeks to elimi-
nate dichotomies or at least to unify or synthesize opposites.").
274. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276,
1292 (1984).
275. Id. at 1291 (citing Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1059,
1074-75 (1980)).
276. Richard Bronaugh, Agreement, Mistake, andObjectivity in the Bargain Theory ofContract,
18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 244 (1976).
277. See id.
278. Id. at 251.
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that actual intent was not reasonably reflected in any external manifestations.
Instead of the singular focus of the reasonable person upon external manifesta-
tions, a two-stage analysis emerges. First, the contracting party must prove that
actual intent differed from manifested intent. Second, the contracting party
must persuade the court of the reasonableness of that subjective intent. The
burden of proof shifts from the plaintiff (promisee) to the defendant (promisor).
The plaintiff satisfies the burden by showing the meaning attributed by the
reasonable person to the defendant's manifestations. Subjective reasonableness
allows the defendant a rebuttal by way of the above two-stage analysis.
The reasonable person as synthesis is a recognition that the reasonable
person need not be the purely external, objective, nonpersonal creation of
classical contract law. The synthesis recognizes that the reasonable person may
possess objective and subjective elements, community and personal values, and
internal and external factors. In terms of the subjective-objective synthesis
within the reasonable person, Professor Eisenberg argues that the objective-sub-
jective mix will vary from case to case. "[S]ubjective principles should be
employed where they serve both fairness and policy, and where they do
not... the principles employed will... typically depend on objective
variables that provide a reliable surrogate .... 279 This can be seen clearly
at work at the genesis of the doctrine of substantial performance. Justice
Cardozo, in the landmark case of Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,280 explains
that law is inevitably a balancing act between the quest for symmetry and
certainty (pure objectivity) and the sentiment towards fairness and equity
(subjectivity of judgment).
Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the development of legal
rules than of practical adaptation to the attainment of a just result will be
troubled by a classification where the lines of division are so wavering and
blurred. Something... may be said on the score of consistency and
certainty in favor of a stricter standard. The courts have balanced such
considerations against those of equity and fairness, and found the latter to
be the weightier.28 '
279. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of ContractLaw, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1107,
1111-12 (1984). Karl Llewellyn noted that as a practical matter a general correlation or synthesis
of the subjective and the objective elements of contract exists. "Is it not clear that if in all but
amazing cases manifestation did not roughly coincide with [subjective] intent, we should have
neither reasonable reliance in fact nor any law of contract to make an 'objective' theory of
peculiar cases necessary?" Llewellyn, supra note 170, at 750-51.
280. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
281. Id. at 891.
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From Cardozo's perspective the reasonable person must weigh factors of
fairness and equity as well as factors of pure objectivity. To do otherwise
would be acting unreasonably.
VI. THE REASONABLE PERSON AND CONTRACT LAW'S INNER EXPERIENCE
Despite the external nature of the reasonable person standard, law at its
quantum level is an inner experience. Contract law in its essence is the internal
belief of what is reasonable and unreasonable. The inner experience of contract
law is different for the different parties in the contractual process. Both parties
to a contract dispute may firmly and in good faith believe that their positions
are morally and legally correct. The reasonable person provides the court with
a tool to determine which party's view is the objectively correct one. The
objective demeanor of the reasonable person, however, is colored by the inner
experience of law. The reasonable person standard entails processing input; the
facts, customs, and circumstances of each case through one's subjective beliefs
of the law and through one's own notion of reasonableness. William James
stated that it "happens relatively seldom that [a] new fact is added raw. More
usually it is embedded cooked, as one might say, or stewed down in the sauce
of old."2 ' Facts, the essence of the reasonable person, are rarely processed
as they appear instead they are perceived through the modifying gaze of past
experience. The reasonable person is not only a creation of the present but also
of the past.
The inner experience of law is not strictly an intrapersonal experience as
envisioned in classical contract law. Classical contract viewed the reasonable
person as a detached, impersonal arbiter of reasonableness. This impartial judge
is to view objectively the facts of the case at issue and make a purely objective
and essentially intrapersonal or nonpersonal determination. In reality, emotional
bonding among the participants in the contract dispute resolution process
frequently occurs. Total detachment is a human impossibility. The reasonable
person is vulnerable to the workings of law's sympathy. "[T]he sentiment of
pity is and always has been a constant factor in modifying usage and laws. 283
The modification of usage and law necessarily results in a change in the
characteristics of the reasonable person. The emotional bonding of ajudge with
the contesting parties impacts upon the subsequent construction of the
reasonable person. Clearly the reasonable person is not the facsimile of Kant's
282. JAMES, supra note 255, at 75.
283. DE TOURTOULON, supra note 65, at 208 (emphasis added); see Note, Sympathy as a Legal
Structure, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1961, 1968 (1992) (noting the judge struggles "between 'empathy'
or emotional bonding ... and 'legality' or rational rules."); see also Gardner, supra note 28, at
3 ("The strength of English Law... resides in a traditional willingness to hear the parties .... );
Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987) (analyzing the
interplay between empathy and legality).
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rational person as envisioned by objectivists. The reasonable person of contracts
possesses a conscience and a soul.
284
The emotional component of the reasonable person can be seen at work
in the development of the doctrine of unconscionability. In the area of
unconscionability the ruse of pure objectivity is abandoned. The subjective
elements of the parties' states of mind become of central import. "[W]e use this
knowledge of the subjectivity of the individual and collective other when we
argue that an unconscionable contract ought not be enforced, even though both
parties [objectively] consented to it . .. ,285 The collective other may well
be the reasonable person of contract. This shift in the unconscionability area
is an open acknowledgment that a purely detached reasonable person suffers
from objective blindness.
The insistence on rational knowledge and, hence, on objects of rational
knowledge, may have blinded us to the possibilities within the human spirit
for arational and arationally [or subjectively] acquired forms of undisci-
plined knowledge... We can, do, and should use our knowledge of the
subjectivity of others, sympathetically and arationally acquired.286
This plea for subjectivity and arationality has not gone unanswered in the
realm of the reasonable person. In practice, a court builds an objective version
of the reasonable person while being influenced by its empathy for the parties
and by its sympathy for fairness and justice.287 A skilled judiciary can
synthesize objectivity and subjectivity within its inner reasonings. Subjectivity
is incorporated within the process of objectively fabricating the reasonable
person. The nature of the construction process allows enough leeway for the
influence of subjective elements. "[A]djudication routinizes both analogy and
modification, each of which enables sympathy's search for common
ground., 28 This is demonstrated through the "ability of judges to distinguish
cases or uncover similarities between them by shifting their perspectives on the
meaning of fact patterns.... [A]nalogy is, after all, imperfect. '289 "Doctrinal
284. Some commentators argue that judicial decision-making is basically intuitive in nature.
See, e.g., Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). The reasonable person can be considered a
product of that intuition.
285. West, supra note 86, at 154.
286. Id. at 152.
287. See RH. Helmholz, Adverse PossessionandSubjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331,358
(1983) ("Judges and juries decide the cases. They do take into account 'subjective factors' when
these can be proved or inferred from the evidence.").
288. Note, supra note 283, at 1969.
289. Id. at 1973.
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flexibility (or indeterminacy) rests on the ability to ... distinguish a new fact
pattern without attacking the facial validity of that previous holding." 2'
This statement of practicality can also be applied to the fabrication of the
reasonable person. This process of legal reasoning allows the judicial mind to
build upon past fabrications and, if need be, to avoid earlier constructions of
the reasonable person. This same selectivity allows the judge to interpret fact
patterns in a way that bolsters the facade of the reasonable person as objective-
ly, rationally, and externally based. The jurist may envision acting objectively,
but the selectivity of perception and the influence of personal and institutional
values29 impact heavily upon objectivity. "[I]n most of the situations we face
we can detect only a modest number of the variables or considerations" 2"
that are present. Because of these human limitations the reasonable person will
remain an imperfect surrogate for the objective theory of contracts.
VII. SUMMA
Some fifty years ago, Dean Roscoe Pound recognized the illusion of
increased objectivity in the law of contracts. "[J]urists have sought objectivity
by elimination of the difficult problems of jurisprudence. .". "' Many
jurists hoped that the reasonable person would provide the mechanical
jurisprudence for which objectivists had yearned. At its greatest stage of
evolution, the reasonable person would play the role of a Kantian rational being
par excellence or reach the stature of a Greek philosopher-king. But at last, the
reasonable person is only as objective as the person's creator. Institutional
values, personal preferences, and the subjective posturing of the contracting
parties will continue to play influential roles in contractual interpretation.
The objective theory of contracts and its reasonable person have molded
the way that contract law is practiced. They have channeled subjectivity into
the terminology of objectivism. The reasonable person, at the least, has
provided capable jurists with a technique of judicial justification. Subjectivity
in the law of contracts has been forced to conform itself to the language of
objectivity. The reasonable person, "though subjectively tainted with rational-
ization," '294 provides an impressive edifice for the notion of an unbiased
application of the rule of law. The divergent elements, both objective and
subjective, that make up contracts are made to contribute to the "rational
development"'295 of contract rules and doctrine. The reasonable person serves
290. Id. at 1975-76.
291. See supra notes 234-41, 258 and accompanying text.
292. HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 20 (1983).
293. Roscoe Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 51 HARV. L. REV. 444, 453 (1938).
294. Newman, supra note 239, at 205.
295. Id.
1997]
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a function of legitimation.296 It provides solace to all parties concerned that
they are being dealt with fairly, objectively, and rationally.297
The reasonable person lives by a creed dedicated to the use of fact and
objectivity in the rendering of interpretive judgments. In the fabrication and
application of the reasonable person standard, the subjectivity of judgment
plays a crucial role in the selection of the facts to be used in the interpretation.
Kelsen saw the free discretion of judges resulting in each "application of law
[and of the reasonable person] as a law-making activity. '298 Limitations to
this notion of unbounded subjectivity exist. Custom, usage, the interpretive
community, and the recognition of institutional values all act upon the
individual judge to conform the reasonable person to a phantom reasonable
person acceptable to other members of the legal community.
296. Alan Hyde, The Concept ofLegitimation in the Sociology ofLaw, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 379,
382 ("'Legitimacy' is a state of widespread belief; namely, the belief that an order is obligatory
or exemplary.") (emphasis added). See generally I MAX VEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968) (discussing concept that social action is often guided
by belief in legitimate order).
297. The Weberian motives of habit, expediency, and legitimacy can be seen working behind
the edifice of the reasonable person. Since it is an "ideal typef]." Hyde, supra note 296, at 387.
298. GorLIEB, supra note 234, at 95.
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